Documents From
Congress' Joint Inquiry into 9/11
Transcript
of hearing
08 Oct 2002
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Joint House And Senate Select Intelligence Committee
SPEAKER: LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. WITNESSES: ELEANOR HILL, STAFF DIRECTOR, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF BODY:
SPEAKERS:
Our objective today is to provide a broader context for understanding the events of September 11. And to that end, today's hearing will focus on lessons that the intelligence community learned or should have learned from the terrorist attacks against the United States that preceded September 11, 2001. Although the September 11 attacks were unprecedented in magnitude and devastation, terrorism is not a new problem for the United States. We are seeking to learn what steps were taken in response to past attacks and what problems hindered a more effective response to terrorism. Today's hearing will be in two parts. First, we will hear from Eleanor Hill, the staff director, who will present a staff statement that reviews the intelligence community's response to past attacks. We will then hear from a panel of distinguished witnesses -- our former Senate colleague Warren Rudman, Judge Louis Freeh, Mary Jo White and Dr. Paul Pillar, whom I will introduce more fully after Ms. Hill's presentation. I will now ask my colleagues, Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Pelosi and Vice Chairman Shelby should they have any introductory remarks today. Chairman Graham? GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have an opening statement. I would like to take a moment to discuss what I hope will be a primary focus of today's discussion -- what I believe to be one of the major challenges facing our national security infrastructure, including the intelligence community -- and that is what steps should be taken to increase domestic security against terrorist operatives who are inside our country, having been recruited, trained and placed to await instructions to strike. I, for one, am deeply concerned that at a recent hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, at which we have representatives from the FBI, the CIA and other agencies, there was an alarming lack of information on this subject. The committee was unable to secure satisfactory answers to questions such as the number a of foreign terrorists who are in our homeland, their training and capabilities, their support systems -- both financial and strategic, including their possible support from foreign governments -- and the command and control systems that might be in place behind them. By that, I mean their linkages to their organizations headquarters generally in the Middle East or Central Asia. All those questions or central to our government's ability to disrupt and deter terrorist plots. And yet, the intelligence community seems to be unable to give satisfactory answers. For example, when asked how many so-called sleepers of one prominent terrorist organization are operating within United States, we were given two widely different estimates. One number from the CIA was described as an "intelligence estimate." The other, from the FBI, was said to be based on active law enforcement cases. There was a chasm between them -- in an unacceptable chasm, in my opinion. I am especially concerned because we are entering a period during which our president's policies in the Middle East are creating heightened tensions and heightened anti-American sentiment. Last Thursday's hearing of the Joint Inquiry Committee -- there were various suggestions for the creation of a separate agency, within the intelligence community, to conduct domestic surveillance. There were parallels drawn to the domestic intelligence structure in Great Britain and other foreign countries. I would like to hear from today's witnesses what approach they would recommend in this critical period, both near term and long-term solutions. Should we look towards devoting additional attention and resources to this problem within our existing intelligence infrastructure? Or should we be creating a new entity for this purpose? Our ultimate concern and our ultimate goal is to assure the greatest possible security for the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Pelosi -- welcome. PELOSI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not have an opening statement except to associate myself with the welcome that you and our distinguished Chairman Graham presented to the witnesses. We look forward to their testimony today. I wish to associate myself with your and Mr. Graham's opening remarks, especially the list of concerns put forth by Senator Graham. I have concerns about -- except to the point of the separate entity, I have serious concerns about that. And while it is true that our ultimate goal is to provide the maximum security for the American people, I know and tears and ranking members share the view that we must do so while protecting our civil liberties. So, with that, I welcome our distinguished witnesses and look forward to their comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GOSS: Thank you, Ms. Pelosi. Vice Chairman Shelby? SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, I don't have an opening statement other -- and I'll be brief, but I do want to commend you and Senator Graham for having these open hearings. I believe, although we cannot talk about everything in an open hearing -- there are a lot of things we shouldn't talk about and will never discuss -- there's a lot of information that will be brought out that the American people need to know about. And I want to commend our staff director, Mrs. Hill, for bringing a story together. And this is a story -- a story that is a big challenge to our intelligence community and to us, as Americans, as far as security is concerned. And without these open hearings, I think a lot of Americans would not have any idea what was going on or what we were trying to do to make our intelligence community work together better to make them stronger were the security ever nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GOSS: Thank you, Senator Shelby. At this time, ask Ms. Hill to proceed with her prepared statement. The floor is yours, Ms. Hill. HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer -- actually, I have two longer versions of this statement, for the record. One is a classified version, which I would ask be made part of the sealed record. And the other is... GOSS: Without objection. HILL: ... an unclassified version, but longer than the summary that I will read... GOSS: Without objection... HILL: ... here, this morning. GOSS: ... in both cases. HILL: Mr. Chairman, members of the two committees, good morning. The purpose of today's hearing is to review past terrorist attacks -- both successful and unsuccessful -- by Al Qaida and by other groups against the United States. This review focuses not only on the attacks themselves, but also on how the intelligence community changed its posture in response and on broader themes that demand close scrutiny by the committees. This review of past attacks and issues is not as deep or as thorough as our inquiry into the events of September 11. Instead, it represents a more general assessment of how well the community has adapted to the post-Cold War world, using counterterrorism as a vehicle. In conjunction with our work regarding the September 11 attacks, the staff has reviewed documents related to past terrorist attacks and interviewed a broad range of individuals involved in counterterrorism throughout the last decade. The documents include formal and informal lessons-learned studies undertaken by different components of the community and the U.S. military; briefings and reports prepared by individuals working the threat at the time; and journalistic and scholarly accounts of the attacks. Interviews included officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Department of State, outside experts and other individuals who possess first-hand knowledge of the community's performance or who can offer broader insights into the challenge of counterterrorism. One particularly helpful report was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's recently completed study of the attack on the USS Cole and the community's performance regarding that attack. This staff statement is intended to provide the two committees with lines of inquiry that we believe are worth pursuing with the panelists who will appear before you today. It has four elements. First, we review briefly several major terrorist attacks or plots against the United States at home and abroad. Second, we note several characteristics of the terrorism challenge that became increasingly apparent in the 1990s. Third, we identify a number of important steps taken by U.S. intelligence and other agencies to combat terrorism more effectively -- steps that almost certainly saved many lives. Fourth and finally, we describe in detail several problems or issues apparent from past attacks, noting how these hindered the overall U.S. response to terrorism. Several of these issues transcend the intelligence community and involve policy issues. Others were recognized early on by the community, but were not fully resolved. The staff has reviewed five past terrorist attacks or attempts against the United States as part of its inquiry into September 11. They are the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center that killed six people and wounded another 1,000; the 1996 attack on the U.S. military at Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 Americans and wounded 500; the 1998 attacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania -- the attacks, which occurred less than 10 minutes apart, destroyed the facilities and killed 12 Americans and over 200 Kenyans and Tanzanians -- more than 4,000 were injured -- many permanently blinded; the planned attacks in 1999 and 2000, around the millennium celebrations; and the 2000 attack on USS Cole, which killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 more. And each of those are gone into in far greater detail in our staff statement. But for purposes of the oral summary, I will not repeat those details. The joint inquiry staff review these five incidents suggests several important characteristics of the emerging terrorist threat. Some were obvious to all, at the time. And others only became clear in retrospect. But all require changes in U.S. counterterrorism efforts and, more broadly, within the intelligence community. The characteristics include the emergence of a new breed of terrorists, practicing a new form of terrorism, different from the state-sponsored, limited-casualty terrorism of the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s -- the new terrorists were not directly sponsored by a state and sought to kill thousands or more in their attacks; the presence of International terrorists who operated in America and were willing to conduct attacks inside America. The relative immunity from international terrorism that America had, for many years, enjoyed was gone. Terrorists would conduct attacks on U.S. soil and organize and raise funds in the United States for attacks overseas. HILL: An adversary, Al Qaida, that is unusual in its dedication, its size, its organizational structure and its mission -- throughout the 1990s, Al Qaida became more skilled and attracted more adherence, making it, in essence, a small army by the end of the decade. The existence of a sanctuary in Afghanistan that allowed Al Qaida to organize, to train, to proselytize, to recruit, to raise funds and to grow into a worldwide menace -- and, finally, the exploitation of permissive environments, such as Yemen, where governments were not willing or able to crack down on radical extremist activity. Unlike Afghanistan, the regimes in these countries did not, necessarily, support Al Qaida, rather they lacked the will or the ability to stop its activities. As these challenges emerged, the intelligence community and, at times, United States government, adopted several important measures that increased America's ability to fight terrorism in general and Al Qaida in particular. Many of these measures can only be described obliquely or cannot be mentioned at all, due to national security requirements a rightful concerns about revealing intelligence methods. Several counterterrorism efforts do, however, deserve mention -- first, the early creation of a special unit to target Bin Laden. Well before Bin Laden became a household name, or even well-known to counterterrorist specialists, the CTC created a unit dedicated to learn more about Bin Laden's activities. This unit quickly determined that Bin Laden was more than a terrorist financier. And it became the U.S. government's focal point for expertise on and operations against Bin Laden. Later, after the 1998 Embassy attacks made the threat clearer, the FBI and the NSA increased their focus on Al Qaida and on Islamic extremism. Second -- innovative legal strategies -- in the trial of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the Department of Justice creatively resurrected the Civil War-era charge of "seditious conspiracy," enabling the U.S. government to prosecute and jail individuals planning terrorist attacks in America. Aggressive renditions -- working with a wide array of foreign governments, the CIA helped deliver dozens of suspected terrorists to the United States or allied countries. These renditions often led to confessions and disrupted terrorist plots by shattering cells and removing key individuals. Improved use of foreign liaison services -- as Al Qaida emerged, several CIA officials recognized that traditional U.S. intelligence techniques were of limited value in penetrating and countering the organization. They understood that foreign liaison could act as a tremendous force multiplier and tried to coordinate and streamline what had been an ad hoc process. Strategic warning on the risk to U.S. interests overseas -- after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the CIA clearly and repeatedly provided warnings to senior U.S. policy makers -- warnings that reached a crescendo in the summer of 2001. Policymakers from both the Clinton and the Bush administrations have testified that the intelligence community repeatedly warned them that Al Qaida was both capable of and seeking to inflict mass casualties on America. Expansion of the FBI overseas -- FBI Director Louis Freeh greatly expanded the number of legal attache offices and focused them more on countries in which terrorism was prevalent or which were important partners against terrorism. By September 11, there were 44 legal attache offices -- up from 16 in 1992. Given the increasing role the FBI and the Department of Justice were playing in counterterrorism, these offices helped ensure that domestic and overseas efforts were better coordinated. Augmenting the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs -- the Joint Terrorism Task Force model was originally created to improve coordination between the FBI and the New York Police Department. The first World Trade Center attack led to the expansion of the JTTFs to other cities and led to the inclusion of CIA officers in several task forces. Improved information sharing -- intelligence officials and policy makers took several measures to improve information sharing on terrorism among leading U.S. government agencies. The National Security Council revived the interagency process on terrorism and threat warning, resulting in regular senior policy maker meetings concerning terrorism. The NSA and the CIA held regular videoconferences among analysts after the 1998 embassy bombings. Although many weaknesses remained, the FBI and the CIA took steps to increase collaboration, which had been extremely poor in the early 1990s, and established rotations in each other's counterterrorism units. Despite these measures to better fight terrorism, the community response was limited by a number of factors, including interpretations of U.S. law and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. Among these factors were -- first, the continued terrorist sanctuary. Up until September 11, Al Qaida raised an army in Afghanistan. Despite the intelligence community's growing recognition that Afghanistan was churning out thousands of trained radicals, there was little effort to integrate all the instruments of national power -- diplomatic, intelligence, economic and military -- to address this problem. Both the Clinton and the Bush administrations took some steps to address the problem of Afghanistan. Former National Security Adviser Berger has testified that after August 1998, quote, "The president authorized a series of overt and covert actions to get Bin Laden and his top lieutenants," close quote. None of these actions appear to have ultimately hindered terrorist training or Al Qaida's ability to operate from Afghanistan. However, Berger also testified that there was little public or congressional support for an invasion of Afghanistan before September 11. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz have testified that, by the time of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration was far along, but not finished, with a policy review that called for more aggressive policy against the Taliban and against Al Qaida in Afghanistan. They were not, however, actively using the military against terrorism before this time. In addition, Al Qaida exploited the laxness of other countries' counterterrorism efforts, or the limits imposed by their legal systems. As the National Commission on Terrorism -- the Bremer Commission -- reported in 1998, some countries use the rhetoric of counterterrorist cooperation, but are unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities in practice, such as restricting the travel of terrorists through their territory. A law enforcement approach to terrorism -- in part because options such as military force were not promising or deemed feasible, the United States defaulted to countering terrorism primarily through arrests and trials. The use of the law enforcement approach had several weaknesses, including allowing Al Qaida continued sanctuary in Afghanistan. The reliance on law enforcement when individuals fled to a hostile country, such as Iran or the Taliban's Afghanistan, appears particularly ineffective, as the masterminds are often beyond the reach of justice. During our interviews, one FBI agent scorned the idea of using the FBI to take the lead in countering Al Qaida, noting that all the FBI can do is arrest and prosecute. He noted that they cannot shut down training camps in hostile countries. In his view, and I quote, "It is like telling the FBI after Pearl Harbor, 'Go to Tokyo and arrest the emperor.'" In his opinion, a military solution was necessary because -- and again, I quote, "The Southern District that doesn't have any cruise missiles," close quote. Although the investigations contributed greatly to America's understanding of Al Qaida, the emphasis on prosecutions, at times, led to the diversion of considerable resources away from intelligence gathering about future threats. Limited FBI aggressiveness at home -- the FBI responded unevenly at home, with only some field offices devoting significant resources to Al Qaida. An overall assessment of the risk to America was not prepared, and much of the FBI's counterterrorism effort was concentrated abroad. This situation reflected a huge gap in the U.S. government's counterterrorism structure -- a lack of focus on how an international terrorist group might target the United States, itself. No agency appears to have been responsible for regularly assessing the threat to the homeland. In his testimony before the joint committees on September 19, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz opined that an attack on United States had followed between cracks in the intelligence community's division of labor. He noted that, quote, "There is a problem of where responsibility is assigned." The CIA and the NSA followed events overseas. And their employees saw their job as passing relevant threat information to be the FBI. The FBI, on the other hand, did not have the strategic analytic capability, independent of individual operations, to prepare comprehensive assessments of U.S. vulnerability and relied heavily on the CIA for much of its analysis. Attention to terrorist activity in United States did, however, often increase after an attack when the links between the extremists in the United States and those overseas became better known. For example, former FBI Counterterrorism Chief Dale Watson said that he only knew of three Al Qaida suspects in the United States before the 1998 Africa embassy bombing. But some 200 FBI counterterrorism cases were opened after those bombings. Lack of a coordinated intelligence community response -- the main intelligence agencies often did not collaborate. They, at times, did not work together to target terrorists and officers at one agency often, unknowingly, withheld information that was needed by another. Classification of data and legal restrictions magnified the problem. Even the CTC -- the intelligence community's counterterrorism organization that was expressly designed to foster a community-wide response suffered from parochialism. Interviews at the NSA, the DIA and the FBI indicate that many officials there saw the CTC primarily as a CIA, rather than a community organization. Beyond the CTC, the JTTFs did not always include CIA officers. Of the 35 JTTFs active on September 11, only six had CIA officers on them. At NSA, officials contended that the responsibility for collecting information concerning foreign radicals in the United States was responsibility of the FBI. NSA maintained that this was true even when these individuals were communicating internationally. As a result, NSA did not use one sensitive collection technique that would have improved its chances of successful collection. NSA adopted this strategy even though its mission included the collection and exploitation of foreign communications that have one communicant in the United States and such coverage would have been available under a FISA. NSA does not appear to have developed a systematic plan to ensure that the FBI would routinely pursue collection in cases where NSA would not do so. The net affect of these collaboration problems was gaps in the collection and analysis of information about individuals and groups operating both in the United States and abroad. The actions of those responsible for the attacks on September 11 demonstrate why effective integration of both domestic and foreign collection is critical in understanding fully the operations of international terrorists. We know now that several hijackers communicated extensively abroad after arriving in the United States. HILL: And at least two entered, left and returned to the United States. Effective tracking of their activities, which would have required coordination among the agencies, might have provided important additional information. Difficulties in sharing law enforcement and intelligence information -- the walls that had developed to separate intelligence and law enforcement often hindered efforts program to investigate terrorist operations aggressively, as we saw in previous testimony about the CIA and FBI action regarding hijackers Kahlid al Mihdhar and Nawafal Hazmi. In addition, misunderstanding, misperceptions and cultural differences led to other types of walls that often hindered the flow of information within the community and between the community and other parts of the U.S. government. Finally, limited changes in intelligence priorities -- as certain threats, including terrorism, increased in the late 1990s, none of the lower level tier one national security priorities were downgraded so that resources, i.e., money and people, could be reallocated. As a result, to much of the intelligence community, everything was a priority. The U.S. wanted to know everything about everything all the time. For example, NSA analysts acknowledged that they had far too many broad requirements -- some 1,500 formal ones -- that covered virtually every situation and every target. Within these 1,500 formal requirements, there were almost 20,000 essential elements of information that were mandated by customers. Analysts understood the gross priorities and worked the requirements that were practicable on any given day. While counterterrorism became an increasingly important concern for senior intelligence community officials, collection and analytic efforts did not keep pace. In closing, as this review suggests, the intelligence community made several impressive advances in fighting terrorism since the end of the Cold War. But many fundamentals steps were not taken. Individual components of the community scored impressive successes or strengthened their effort against terrorism, but important gaps remained. These included many problems outside the control or the responsibility of the intelligence community, such us the sanctuary terrorists enjoyed in Afghanistan and the legal limits on information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement officials. However, another major contributing factor was that the community did not fully learn the lessons of past attacks. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaida was able to exploit the gaps in the U.S. counterterrorism structure to carry out its devastating attacks. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. GOSS: Thank you very much, Ms. Hill. As usual, that's very comprehensive and I draw members' attention to even more comprehensive versions of it that are in your books. And there is a classified version, as well, which is worth reading. HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GOSS: Before introducing our witnesses, the committees have received statements for the record that will not be accompanied today by oral testimony. But I should note one of these statements was submitted by Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation, who is an expert on terrorism, and the second was provided by Mr. Kie Fallis, a counterterrorism analyst formally assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Hoffman's and Mr. Fallis's statements be made part of the record of this hearing. Without objection, so ordered. Members may submit questions for the record to follow up on matters appropriately addressed to Dr. Hoffman and Mr. Fallis. I also ask unanimous consent that did the de-classified findings and recommendations from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's inquiry into intelligence collection reporting analysis and warning relevant to the bombing of the USS Cole be placed in the record. Without objection, so ordered. I would now like to introduce the distinguished members of our panel today. First, Senator Warren Rudman served in the Senate for two terms from 1981 through 1992. Among other committee assignments, he chaired the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, was the vice chairman of the Senate Iran Contra Committee and was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Since leaving the Senate, Senator Rudman has led commissions that have examined the U.S. intelligence community and emerging threats to the United States until December 2001 he served as the chairman of the president's and Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator, welcome. RUDMAN: Thank you. GOSS: Judge Louis Freeh served as director of the FBI from September 1993 to June 2001. Prior to his service as FBI director, he had a distinguished career have been FBI agent, federal prosecutor, U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York. Judge Freeh, welcome, sir. Mary Jo White is the former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. Her office prosecuted those responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center, the plot against New York landmarks in 1993, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, as well as numerous other important cases of concern to this committee. We welcome you, Ms. White. Thank you for joining us. Dr. Paul Pillar is the National intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Dr. Pillar has served in senior positions at the Central Intelligence Agency, including as the deputy chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center. He is the author of "Terrorism in U.S. Foreign Policy." I would recommend that to anybody. As far as I am concerned, it is pretty close to the Bible and has served us well. Unfortunately, not enough people have read it, apparently. Dr. Pillar, welcome. Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for this joint inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. I will ask the witnesses to rise at this time. I think, Mr. Fallis and Dr. Hoffman -- I might as well ask you, if you don't mind, to rise and be sworn, as well -- and just in case there are questions. Thank you. We're missing Dr. Hoffman, I guess. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you will give before these committees will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? FREEH: I do. RUDMAN: I do. WHITE: I do. PILLAR: I do. HOFFMAN: I do. FALLIS: I do. GOSS: Thank you very much. The full statement of the witnesses will be placed in the record of these proceedings, as usual. And I will now call on Senator Rudman, then Judge Freeh, then Ms. White and then Dr. Pillar, in that order, the to give their opening spoken remarks. Thank you. We welcome you all. We are truly glad you're here. Senator Rudman, the floor is yours, sir. RUDMAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to be here -- the committee I served on -- one of my favorite committees in my time in the Senate. And I'm honored to appear before you. I expect that two of the things that I did in the last few years are of interest to you. And I'll try to draw from them in my testimony. First, of course, chairing of PFIAB; second, chairing Hart- Rudman; and third, something that I want to talk about a bit this morning -- that Chairman Goss is very familiar with -- and that is the roles and other responsibilities of the intelligence community for the 21st century, which we prepared at the request of this Congress -- I think it's Public Law 971. I wish more people had read it. And I want to talk a little bit about it this morning. I would highly recommend that every staff member read this before you write your final report, if you haven't already. And I would think that members might want to read some portions of it because it was a very distinguished group of Americans who spent a lot of time looking, in advance of 9/11, at precisely the things that you are looking at post-9/11. And I want to just give you a couple of excerpts from that. And I will take five or six minutes. I do not have a prepared statement. But, rather, I thought I would respond to specific questions addressed to me by the leadership of the committee. The first question that you asked was did -- our national study the security group -- Hart-Rudman -- warned in 2001 that the United States was not prepared to deal with terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland. Please summarize why you felt that to be true at the time, what steps were taken, if any, in response to our report and why we believe the important steps were not taken and what measures remain to be taken. Briefly, this commission was commissioned by the Congress and the previous administration. Its task was to prepare a report on U.S. national security -- 21st century -- to be limited to the incoming president in 2001. So no one knew who that would be at that time or what party that person would be on. It was a totally bipartisan group. We spent a huge amount of time. We traveled all over the world. We met with friend and foe. We met with intelligence agencies -- those with whom we have good relations and those with whom we have poor relations. And we came to the overwhelming conclusion at the end of our study that we were facing an asymmetric threat to our entire national security structure. And, to everyone's surprise, our lead recommendation dealt with homeland security and international terrorism. No one on that committee would have thought, at the time that we started, that that would have been our conclusion. We would have thought it might have been more in the area of DOD reorganization or intelligence reorganization or changing the State Department -- changing public diplomacy. It was not. And you are all familiar with the report. I have discussed with many of you, personally. We said, in that report, quote, more or less, "Large numbers of Americans will die on American soil, victims of terrorism, in the coming century." It happened a bit sooner rather than later. Why did we come to that conclusion? It was obvious from the excellent history that Eleanor Hill gave you a few minutes ago, it was an escalation of attacks against American interests. It was quite apparent that the homeland was not secure and that at a point in time, those terrorist -- be it Al Qaida or many other groups, some of which you are, I'm sure, studying -- others which you may not be -- that someone would launch an attack in this country. We talked about weapons of mass destruction. We talked about weapons of mass disruption. And we laid it out in laborious detail because it was overwhelmingly apparent to all of us that that was going to happen. We made a number of recommendations. In late January 2001, we presented it to the new administration, to the national security adviser -- the vice president through the national security adviser and the president -- secretary of state -- secretary of defense. It was very well received. People were very interested in it. We brought it up here. We met with a number of you on this committee. To the credit of the Congress, a number of you immediately started moving towards a homeland security department, which has now, I understand, wound up in some controversy. But I expect eventually it will happen. And we made a number of recommendations. The Congress reacted very quickly to them and started to act on them, particularly in the House -- Congressman Mac Thornberry -- here in the Senate, Senator Fred Thompson and Senator Joe Lieberman. The administration's attitude was this is an excellent report. We are giving it to an internal task force of the NSC and we will start to go through it. I find no fault in that. This is a brand new administration. It had much on its plate. It was February-March time frame, of 2001. And my understanding is that they were in the process of working on the recommendations. Now, DOD, in fact, had done some of the things that we had recommended. So I would say that, although people might criticize and say that the administration should have acted more forthrightly, my sense is for a new administration receiving a voluminous report, including an implementation plan, they probably did about all that any administration would have done, under the circumstances. And let me also say that had every recommendation that we had put into that plan been adopted the day after we gave it to the White House, I seriously doubt that that would have been sufficient to prevent 9/11 for many reasons, including some of the reasons that your staff director has talked about here, today. Your second question -- we said that military consumers often drove intelligence collection and that given limited resources, the community was neglecting important regions and trends. How did this affect the ability of United States to understand the growth of capabilities and locations such as Afghanistan and Yemen? Would placing more of the intelligence community under the authority of the director of Central Intelligence prevent similar problems in the future? The answer to your question is generally yes. Up until September 11, the bulk of U.S. intelligence efforts had been focused on states. That has been the historic role of United States intelligence community. And I might add that our intelligence community, as well as most foreign ones that I have studied, are extraordinarily good at looking at structure, at capability and intent. They don't have a very good track record, even working against states, for determining what and when. And I'm not sure that that will ever be totally solved, no matter how hard we try. To try to come up with definition on people's intentions, whether they be states or they be shadowy terrorist organizations, is the toughest assignment given to any intelligence community. And, frankly, if you look at the record over the last 50 years, the record is not particularly good -- not here or anywhere else. RUDMAN: Do I believe or did our commission believe that making the director of the CIA -- giving him a stronger role -- we do. But we are not the first ones to say that. This has been recommended for many years. I mean, you have a director of Central Intelligence who is also the director of the CIA -- 85 percent of that budget is controlled by DOD. From what I read in the papers lately, they would like to get even more control of it. And I leave that to you. You were elected to solve problems like that. I don't know what the answer is. We have tried to recommend a number of reasonable solutions in this report, of which a number of members of Congress have done. Nothing has happened except I do believe there is a stronger community coordination effort since this report than there was before. But you've got a long way to go. And, frankly, I think it's the court of the Congress as much as it is the administration. We call for the president, through the NSC, to set strategic intelligence priorities and update them regularly. Was this done? Is it being done today? Well, I can tell you that I am no longer chairman of the PFIAB, so I am no longer privy to those things. But my understanding is that, yes, there has been broad strategic intelligence directives -- PDDRs -- which have been adopted by this administration. I am sure they are available to this committee. And I would advocate that you check with them to get a more precise answer. Three more questions you have asked -- how can the United States improve cooperation between intelligence agencies focused overseas -- the CIA, NSA, et cetera -- and those with domestic focus, such as the FBI? And how could they take full advantage of each other's capabilities? What gaps existed in their cooperation prior to September 11? I believe that the joint terrorism centers, which these committees are very familiar with, have come a long way in cooperation. But we have got some very interesting issues here that have to do with law, civil rights, the rights of Americans. I was saying to Louis Freeh before we testified this morning that you go back and read the history of the 1946-'47 National Intelligence Act at it was very clear that the FBI was responsible for domestic counterintelligence -- and I would expect counterterrorism. And the CIA was responsible overseas. And the CIA had better not come close to putting its nose anywhere near domestic issues. It was a wonderful alliance of strange bedfellows. J. Edgar Hoover and the American Civil Liberties Union -- they both had their precise reasons for feeling that way. But the result has been that we have not had the cooperation between these agencies that we should have. I think there ought to be major changes in the law. I have felt that way for a long time. Let me add, just in response to one of the questions posed in one of the opening statements, to create a new MI5-type organization in this country we do not believe, in our commission, would be the solution. You've got enormous domestic collection capability in the FBI, assuming it is focused in the right direction. That is a tough issue and one this committee and the Judiciary Committee will have to work with. How effective do you believe that law enforcement tools are for fighting terrorism? Were they relied upon excessively before September 11? The answer to that, I guess, is yes and no. Mary Jo White brought very successful prosecutions against a number of terrorist organizations in the Southern District of New York. On the other hand, President Bush says we are now at war. Well, if we are at war, then law enforcement tools will be used, but in a more minor way. And military tools will be used more effectively to deal with the capability of terrorism. So, I guess, the answer to that question is both in the affirmative and in the negative. And, finally, any recommendations you may have for improving the intelligence community's performance in fighting terrorism? I believe that the more jointness that you have between these agencies -- the more they work in joint counterterrorism centers -- the more their information databases become common -- a more there is constant daily -- hourly cooperation between them -- the more that the NSA is brought in, by statute if necessary, to subline (ph) the FBI with domestic counterterrorism information, then you'll do the improvement you need. I do not believe we need new structures or new systems. We may need different kinds of people or we may -- different kinds of technology, but I don't think there is anything wrong with the systems. But I think there is a lot wrong with how they have been used over the last 10 years. Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to read to you from this report, which was submitted in 1996 to the Congress, at the Congress' direction. As I said, Chairman Goss served on this and a number of other people that you all know. It was a very distinguished group -- entitled "Commission on Roles and Capabilities of United States Intelligence Community." There is a lot of great recommendations in it. There is one here that is particularly interesting and it's from the executive summary. And it is spelled out in detail, but I'm not going to do that. I'm just going to read you two paragraphs. It is entitled "The Need for a Coordinated Response to Global Crime." "Global criminal activity carried out by foreign groups -- terrorism, international drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international organized the crime is likely to pose increasing dangers to the American people in the years ahead, as perpetrators grow more sophisticated and take advantage of new technology. Law enforcement agencies historically have taken the lead in responding to these threats. But where U.S. security is threatened, strategies which employ diplomatic, economic, military or intelligence measurers may be required instead of, or in collaboration with, law enforcement response. In the commission's view, it is essential that there be overall direction and coordination of U.S. response to global crime." I will tell you that nobody, evidently, read it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GOSS: Thank you very much, Senator Rudman, for, obviously, a very illuminating presentation to us. We now go to Judge Freeh. Welcome, sir. The floor is yours. FREEH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Graham, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify here, today. When I went back and recounted all of the appearances that I have made before the Congress -- the first one, actually, was in 1980, before Senator Rudman when I was a FBI agent. But other than that, I have appeared before these two committees more than all of the other committees to which the FBI director reports. And I think that is symbolic, one, of the attention that this committee and the bipartisan leadership, which I always have commended and commend today, has taken up the issues of national security and particularly counterterrorism. Some of those hearings were requested by the committee, some were requested by myself. And this committee, over the years, has been outstanding in its support and its thinking ahead for the issues that we needed to deal with. I would ask the committee's indulgence for -- what I will try to do in a summary fashion, but which I think is going to take some more time than I had planned. First of all, I would like to begin by expressing my condolences to the victims of not just the horrific events of September 11, but all of the victims of terrorism. And in the 26 years that I have spent as a FBI Agent, Army officer, a prosecutor or judge, I have strived every day, as have my colleagues, to ensure that the people that we were required to protect were protected to the best of our ability. And I would like to say here a few words about the men and women in law enforcement. And I know how much they are appreciated by this committee, but I know I speak this morning to a larger audience. All of those who serve in law enforcement and public safety go to work every day committed to laying down their lives for the people that they protect. On September 11, dozens of law enforcement officers, firefighters -- other brave people willingly did so. FBI Special Agent Lenny Hatton and retired FBI Special Agent John O'Neill unselfishly sacrificed their lives that day. John and Lenny represent the very finest of the FBI -- men and women of whom I am immensely proud of and whose courage, skill and sacrifices and dedication in combating crime and terrorism, both here in this country and on the ground in far away dangerous places, deserves the nation's praise and enduring respect. It was a great and unique privilege to serve with these extraordinary Americans. And we are sincerely thankful for Director Mueller's able leadership and for the FBI -- so dedicated to the people it serves. I often had the occasion to work with John O'Neill. He was, as you know, the FBI's counter-terrorism chief who helped forge the historical relationship between the FBI and the CIA, about which I would like to say a few words. John and I stood together on the deck of the USS Cole in Aden shortly after the October 2000 attack against our warship. As we stood there, we watched young FBI agents reverently remove the remains of those 17 sailors from the hull of the ship, which was about 110 degrees. We watched silently and reverently as this was done and observed what was, indeed, an act of war against the United States. In June of 1996, John and I stood together in front of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, as hundreds of FBI men and women, working in 120 degree temperatures, sifted through tons of debris, removing human remains and evidence, intent on doing that which law enforcement can do when there is an act of war committed against America. In Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998, again I watched hundreds of FBI men and women sifting through the shattered ruins of our embassies, recovering human remains and evidence, all of us determined to bring to justice those who had committed these acts of war against the United States. In February 1993, I was sitting in my courtroom in Foley Square when the World Trade Center was attacked by foreign, Al Qaida-trained terrorists. I walked quickly from the courthouse. When I got to Chambers Street, I saw dozens and dozens of FBI agents streaming out of their building down the street towards the smoke-filled building. My images and memories of these painful events are both horrific and heroic. The horror and suffering of the victims, balanced in a small but vital way, by the bravery and heroism of the rescuers. It was amazing to me that this part of the scene was always the same. FBI men and women -- whether it was New York City, Dhahran, Aden, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam -- exhausted, many sick and dehydrated, working until they literally dropped, in some cases, down on their knees digging with their fingers, working in harms' way. In Yemen and East Africa, to do that work, they had to be surrounded 24 hours by FAST teams of U.S. Marines to protect their lives. And all the time, working -- pursing justice under the Rule of Law. Another thing that has been a constant was the FBI's concern and support for the survivors of these horrendous acts. Their testimony in these cases speaks eloquently about the superb professionalism and dedication of the FBI's counterterrorism men and women. They have cared for and spent hundreds of hours comforting, informing and caring for these survivors. On numerous occasions, I visited with the surviving families of the Americans killed in East Africa, on board the USS Cole -- at Khobar Towers. We never tried to be too busy elsewhere that we stop pursuing the killers of their loved ones. One of the most moving events in my years of public service was in June of 2001, days before I left the FBI, when all 19 families of the Khobar Towers victims came to my office and thanked me and the FBI for not forgetting about them. And, as I said, it was an honor to work with men like John O'Neill -- thousands of others -- people who you know well -- Dale Watson and Cofer Black -- dedicated Americans for whose bravery, skill and absolute integrity America will always be thankful. I would also like to commend President Bush and the Congress for their immediate responses in kind to the acts of those who are responsible for the events of September 11. Even after my 26 years of public service, I was awestruck to see a united America exercise the will and might to carry out an all-exclusive, far-reaching and total war against terrorists who, from far away sanctuaries, have threatened and attacked America for decades. I would like to take a few minutes this morning to provide a broad overview of the terrorism threat -- the FBI's role and history in fighting it. I would also like to focus on both the successes and the limitations of that mission prior to September 11, important, I think, because the threats and needs for resources and authorities were the same on September 10 as they were on September 12. I would also offer some ideas for strengthening and improving our national security without weakening the foundation upon which our country has been built -- governance under the Rule of Law. Terrorism has been waged, against us and others, for centuries. It is inevitable and it's a sad fact that it is, that every act of terrorism cannot be prevented, even under the best of circumstances. FREEH: If reality were otherwise, some government or regime, using unlimited resources and unrestrained power, would have come up with a 100 percent preventive formula. Our enemies from time-to-time are equally capable of an attack against us, especially when they are anxious to die in the endeavor. No agency or country -- particularly in a democracy where the Rule of Law is respected -- can be expected to foil and prevent every planned attack. Such a standard will never be met. Nevertheless, our law enforcement, intelligence agencies, our political, economic, military and our diplomatic policies must strive to get as close to that 100 percent as humanly possible. The intelligence community and the FBI, in my opinion, does not appear to have had sufficient information to prevent the September 11 attacks. What has been stated recently to this committee, in closed session, I believe, and later released, was a statement by FBI Director Mueller. And I would like to repeat an excerpt of it. He testified before you as follows. "The plans for the September 11 attacks were hatched and financed overseas over a several year period. Each of the hijackers, apparently purposely selected to avoid notice, came easily and lawfully from abroad. While here, the hijackers effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage. As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States. They committed no crimes, with the exception of minor traffic violations. They dressed and acted like Americans -- shopping and eating at places like Wal-Mart and Pizza Hut. They came into different cities, moved around a lot and did not hold jobs. When three got speeding tickets in the days heading up to September 11, they remained calm and aroused no suspicion. One of the suicide hijackers, al-Hazmi, even reported an attempted street robbery on May 1, 2001, to Fairfax, Virginia, police -- he later declined to press charges. None of the nineteen suicide hijackers are known to have had computers, laptops or storage media of any kind, although they are known to have used publicly accessible Internet connections at various locations. They used 133 different pre-paid calling cards to call from various pay phones, cell phones and land lines. The 19 suicide hijackers used U.S. checking accounts, accessed with debit cards, to conduct the majority of financial activity during the course of this conspiracy. Meetings and communications between the hijackers were done without detection, apparent surveillance flights were taken, and nothing illegal was detected through airport security screening. In short, the terrorists had managed very effectively to exploit loopholes and vulnerabilities in our system. To this day we have found no one in the United States, except the actual hijackers, who knew of the plot. And we have found nothing they did while in the United States that triggered a specific response about them," close quote. We have read and heard much about the July 2001 memo by a Phoenix Special Agent, the Minnesota arrest and investigation of Moussaoui in August, and the information which the CIA obtained regarding two of the 19 hijackers, relating to a Kuala Lumpur meeting in 2000. It is very important, in hindsight, to segregate this relevant information and put it into a dedicated timeline. However, the predictive value of these diverse facts at the time that they were being received must be evaluated. Analyzing intelligence information can be like trying to take a sip of water coming out of a fire hydrant. The several bits of information, clearly connected and predictive after the fact, need to be viewed in real time. The reality is that these unquestionably important bits have been plucked from a sea of thousands and thousands of such bits at the time. Additionally, as this committee well knows, the difference between strategic and tactical intelligence is critically important to keep in mind. Although not privy to all the relevant information known to this Committee, I am aware of nothing that, to me, demonstrates that the FBI and the intelligence community had the type of information or tactical intelligence which could have prevented the horror of September 11. In terms of the FBI's capability to identify, investigate and prevent 19 hijackers from carrying out their attacks, the facts so far on the public record do not support the conclusion that these tragic events could have been prevented by the FBI and intelligence community acting by themselves. This is not to say things could have been done better or that more resources or authorities would not have helped. It is only to say I have not seen a reporting of facts that leads to that conclusion, with one important caveat. Because of the narrow focus of this inquiry, I leave aside any view of the larger, but very relevant, issues raised even this morning by Eleanor Hill, like foreign policy, military might, airline safety, national commitment. Identification, investigation and arrest of dangerous terrorists and those who support them is prevention. I would like to try to dispel the notion that investigation is not part of prevention. And I think Mary Jo White will speak about that a little bit. For instance, the FBI's criminal investigation of the 1993 World Trade Tower bombing led directly to the discovery and prosecution of a terrorist plot to blow up New York City tunnels, buildings and infrastructure, which would have killed thousands of innocent people. The FBI's investigation, at that time, led to evidence and witnesses whose cooperation directly prevented a major terrorist attack. In my experience, the identification, pursuit and arrest of terrorists are the primary means of preventing terrorism in some cases. The FBI and CIA have jointly been doing this successfully for many years. Our investigation and pursuit of Ramzi Yousef, after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, led to the Philippines and helped to prevent his plot to blow up 11 United States airliners in the Western Pacific. His arrest in Pakistan by FBI Agents certainly prevented him from carrying out further acts of terrorism against America. Bringing Yousef and the East Africa embassy bombers back to the United States and convicting them in New York City without a doubt prevented them from carrying out more terrorism against America. As these committees have known for several years, the FBI and the CIA have carried out joint operations around the world to disrupt, exploit and recover evidence on Al Qaida operatives who have targeted the United States. These operations, in part designed to obtain admissible evidence, also had the critical objectives of destroying the operational capability of terrorist organizations, collecting valuable intelligence and being able to support our military, should such a response be unleashed. Law enforcement's ability to act against entrenched terrorists in overseas sanctuaries is very limited. And I will repeat here, in theme, another point made by your counsel this morning. The FBI and CIA can devise and implement a very effective counterterrorism strategy, both inside the United States and overseas. However, often a greater involvement of national resources is required. For instance, General Noriega was investigated and indicted by the Department of Justice in 1988, operating out of what he thought was a safe, foreign haven. Noriega and his military-like organization were sending tons of deadly drugs into the United States, causing the deaths and devastation of countless Americans. The FBI and DEA built a case and executed the arrest warrant on Noriega in Panama, only because our military can and did do what law enforcement and intelligence cannot do. Osama bin Laden was indicted in 1998, actually prior to Al Qaida's bombings of our embassies in East Africa. Like Noriega, Osama bin Laden remained secure and operational in his foreign, safe haven. Once the collective will to go in and get him was summoned, it happened with striking speed. The Pan Am 103 bombing is another such example of an FBI case where the Libyan intelligence service was the target of our investigation. I certainly don't equate Noriega and Osama bin Laden, in terms of their destructiveness and evil. However, the comparison makes an obvious, but often overlooked, point that our response to terrorism must be expansive, unmistakable and unwavering across all levels of the United States Government. I particularly want to commend George Tenet, and the courageous men and women of the CIA, for fighting bravely on the front lines of this war for many years. Under Mr. Tenet's sound leadership, dedication and vision, the CIA has achieved great successes in rolling-up major terrorist plots in Albania, Jordan, South East Asia and many other places. Importantly, the CIA and FBI have been fully cooperating and jointly carrying out America's counter-terrorism war for many years. And I will make this point again and again this morning. The coordination between the FBI and the CIA in counterterrorism, in my eight years of experience, has been exemplary. They formed -- the FBI and the CIA -- the first joint dedicated Al Qaida-Osama bin Laden cell to study it a year prior to the August 1998 East African embassy bombings. But the fact is that working at their best and highest levels of efficiency and cooperation, the FBI and CIA together will still fall short of war -- a total war against terrorism. As these committees well know, total war -- as we have recently done it -- requires bold leadership, supported by the will of Congress and the American people. Its success is ultimately dependent upon the united and unrelenting efforts of foreign policy, military assets, vast resources, legal authorities and international alliances and cooperation. I realize that your committees' efforts have publicly focused, for the most part, on the intelligence community and the FBI. And I'm confident that the upcoming commission, should there be one, will more fully examine these broader issues with a global view. It should be obvious, for instance, that the FBI, with about 3.5 percent of the country's counterterrorism budget, and the CIA, with their share comprise but pieces of a mosaic of a total government commitment needed to fight the war on terrorism. For instance, U.S. airlines and aviation have long been known as a major target for terrorist attacks. I have cited in my statement a 1996 GAO report which concluded, quote, "nearly every major aspect of the system, ranging from the screening of passengers; checked and carry-on baggage; mail and cargo; as well as access to secured areas within airports and aircraft, has weaknesses that terrorists could exploit," close quote. In the aftermath of the tragedy of TWA Flight 800 in New York City, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was formed. I, along with New York City Police Department Commissioner Ray Kelly, Bill Coleman, Franklin Raines, Jim Hall, and other distinguished Americans, served as commissioners, appointed by President Clinton. The chairman of the commission was Vice President Al Gore, who did an excellent job leading the effort and making much needed recommendations. Known as the "Gore Commission," the panel made its final report and recommendations on February 12, 1997. For example, in Recommendation 3.19, entitled "Complement Technology with Automated Passenger Profiling," this contemplated the development of a passenger profiling system wherein law enforcement and intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists would be used in passenger profiling. The critical issue of terrorism directed against our aviation security was well known for many years prior to September 11. As this committee knows, the FBI conveyed repeated warnings to the FAA and the airline industry regarding terrorism right up to September 11, 2001. Efforts by the government and the airline industry to implement these and other recommendations deserve intensive and careful study, and, most likely, massive resources. This is not to criticize the FAA, which does a difficult job very well. Rather, the point is that while the CIA and the FBI should be intensely examined regarding September 11, they should not be examined in a vacuum. The Executive and the Congress -- the various government agencies with primary responsibility for public safety and national security, foreign policy, technologies, as well as the private sector and the international community are all components in whether or not terrorism is addressed with the vigor it deserves. You have asked me to talk about resource allocation and whether sufficient resources were allocated to and within the FBI for fighting terrorism. The short answer is that the allocations were insufficient to maintain the critical growth and priority of the FBI's counterterrorism program. The Gore Commission agreed when it recommended, quote, "we significantly increased the number of FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence and to crisis response." In 1993, the FBI had under 600 special agents and 500 support positions funded for its entire counterterrorism program -- domestic and international. By 1999, that allocation had increased to around 1,300 agents and a like amount of support positions. While at first blush that may sound like a lot, the FBI had requested significantly more counterterrorism resources during this period. And I note, for the record, that this committee supported those recommendations, as best it could. This was done because I had made the prevention, disruption and defeat of terrorism one of the FBI's highest priorities. We knew that many areas, like analysis and technology, needed huge influxes of new resources. FREEH: Let me read from our May 8, 1998, Strategic Plan, quote, "The FBI has identified three general, functional areas that describe the threats which it must address to realize the goal of enhanced national and individual security. Tier one -- National and Economic Security -- foreign intelligence, terrorist and criminal activities that directly threaten the national or economic security of the United States." Quote, "These offenses fall almost exclusively within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Issues arising in this area are of such importance to U.S. national interests that they must receive priority attention. To succeed, we must develop and implement a proactive, nationally directed program. Strategic Goal: Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur. Terrorism, is both international and domestic, poses arguably the most complex and difficult threat of any of the threats for which the FBI has a major responsibility. New perpetrators - loosely organized groups and ad hoc coalitions of foreigners motivated by perceived injustices, along with domestic groups and disgruntled American citizens have attacked United States interests at home and abroad. The dilemma, of course, is that the new perpetrators, targets, and weapons exist in almost unlimited numbers, while the law enforcement resources arrayed against them are finite." In my report to the American people on the FBI in 1998, entitled, quote, "Ensuring Public Safety and National Security Under the Rule of Law", I wrote, quote, "One of my major priorities has been to seek increased funding for the FBI's counterterrorism programs. The Congress has shown great foresight in strengthening this vital work. For example, the counterterrorism budget for fiscal year 1996 was $97 million. The fiscal year 1999 budget contains $301 million for counterterrorism efforts." Quote, "Some terrorism now comes from abroad. Some terrorism is homegrown. But whatever its origin, terrorism is deadly and the FBI has no higher priority than to combat terrorism -- to prevent it where possible. Our goal is to prevent, detect and deter." Foreign terrorists in United States -- and a lot of this goes to the point of whether we were focused on domestic threats from terrorists -- terrorism, quote, "can be carried out by U.S. citizens or by persons from other countries. At one time, with these crimes erupting in much of the world, many Americans felt we were immune from terrorism with foreign links." All of that ended in 1993. The type of terrorism which had previously occurred far from our shores was brought home in a shocking manner when, in February, a massive explosion occurred in the parking garage at the World Trade Center complex in New York City. The 1998-2000 period was critical and unprecedented regarding both the changes in and the demands on the FBI's counterterrorism program and its domestic and international responsibilities. As examples, we indicted Osama bin Laden in June of 1998 and again in November 1998. We put Bin Laden and Al Qaida on the FBI's Top Ten list, in April of 1999, making them our number one counterterrorism priority. Also in 1999, we set up a dedicated Osama bin Laden Unit at FBI Headquarters. We stood up for overseas deployment five rapid deployment teams to respond to terrorist threats against America around the world. With help from Congress, we began to position ourselves around the globe in places that matter in the fight against terrorism. Without those FBI legats, the post-September 11 advances could never had been made with such speed and surety. We doubled and tripled the number of joint terrorism task forces around the United States so we could multiply our forces and coordinate intelligence and counterterrorism operations with the FBI's federal, state and local law enforcement partners. Thirty-four of these JTTF's were in operation by 2001. The FBI was also given national responsibility for coordinating the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure. As a result, we created the National Infrastructure Protection Center at FBI headquarters, which had critical responsibilities regarding terrorist threats and cyberattacks. We were also tasked to set up the National Domestic Preparedness Office to counter terrorist threats and to enhance homeland security. We began making preparations for the 2000 Olympics, the millennium, United Nations and NATO meetings in New York City, World Cup, IMF-World Bank events, presidential conventions and other major events which absorbed vast numbers of FBI counterterrorism resources. At the same time, we were conducting major terrorism investigations leading up to the successful prosecution in New York City of the Al Qaida members who attacked our embassies in Africa. We stood up the massive Strategic Information Operations Center at FBI headquarters, whose main purpose was to give us the capability to work several major and simultaneous terrorist matters at the same time. We established the FBI's Counterterrorism Center at FBI headquarters, which was coordinated with the CIA's center by communications, information exchange, and personnel staffing. GOSS: Judge Freeh, may I interrupt you, sir, for a moment? FREEH: Certainly. GOSS: Members have been notified by bells that we have a vote in the House. I understand there is a 15-minute vote, followed by two fives. The 15-minute vote has about -- probably eight -- nine minutes left on it. And we will be excusing ourselves to run over and make those votes. But I understand that we will continue on and Chairman Graham will be taking over. Excuse me for the interruption, sir. FREEH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Freeh -- continue, please. FREEH: We instituted MAX CAP O5 in July 2000 to enable each of our FBI's 56 field offices and their special agents in charge to improve our counterterrorism efforts, analyze threats and develop capabilities and strategies throughout the United States. Regional SAC conferences were held during the summer of 2000 to roll out the MAX CAP O5 strategy. We set up a national threat warning system in order to disseminate terrorism-related information to state and local authorities around the country. We organized and carried out a significant number of national, regional and local practical exercises to help the country prepare for terrorist attacks. The attorney general and I conducted regular meetings with the national security advisor and the secretary of state dedicated to terrorism issues, cases and threats. I met with dozens of presidents, prime ministers, kings, emirs, law enforcement, intelligence and security chiefs around the world. The primary reason for these contacts was to pursue and enhance our counterterrorism program by forging an international network of cooperation. We proposed and briefly received from Congress the authority to hire critical scientists, linguists and computer specialists without the salary restrictions of Title 5. The Department of Justice and the FBI prepared hundreds of FISA court applications in counterterrorism matters. I regularly met and discussed counterterrorism issues, intelligence and force protection issues with the attorney general, the national security advisor, United States Attorneys, the secretaries of defense and state, our ambassadors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps, most significantly, as to the issue of our focus on the terrorist threat, in November 1999, I created a new FBI counterterrorism division. Nobody in the Executive or the Congress suggested that this step be taken. I took it because I firmly believed that it was necessary to expand and enhance the FBI's counterterrorism capability. Dale Watson was elevated to run this new division and develop new strategies. At the same time, I proposed the creation of a new investigative services division to support the new counterterrorism division, as well as the criminal and national security divisions. My purpose in doing so was to put together all of the FBI's analytical and support assets in order to better prevent terrorism and enhance our intelligence bases with the resources that we had available. Nine months later, this reorganization was approved and the FBI, for the first time, consolidated its counterterrorism program assets with the support of a greater analytical engine. In February 2001, we held a National Counterterrorism Conference to roll out details of the MAX CAP 05 strategy. The 2000, 2001 and 2002 pre-September 11 budgets fell far short of the counterterrorism resources we knew were necessary to do the best job. This is not meant as a criticism, but a reminder for the record that total war against terrorists was not the same priority before September 11 as it is today. Here are the numbers -- for fiscal years 2000, 2001 and 2002, FBI counterterrorism budgets, I asked for a total of 1,895 special agents, analysts, linguists and others. The final, enacted allocation we received was 76 people, over those three years. In fiscal year 2000, I requested 864 additional counterterrorism people, at a cost of $380.8 million. I received 5 people, funded for $7.4 million. Thus, at the most critical time, the available resources for counterterrorism did not address the known critical needs. By contrast, in response to the FBI's fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental request for additional counterterrorism-related resources, Congress enacted 823 positions and $745 million in new funding, all things which we needed prior to September 11. A final note on FBI resources to carry out its critical mission, including waging war against terrorists. To win a war it takes soldiers. Front line troops, as you know, each require several more soldiers to support them. I don't know if your staff has advised you, but even after September 11, the FBI has less FBI agents today -- 11,516 special agents -- than it had in 1999, when the number was 11,681. By way of comparison, in 1992, before I became director, the FBI had 10,479. That's only 1,037 less than today -- an average, annual growth of about 103 special agents per year over the last decade. We also must keep in mind that these 11,516 special agents have responsibility for other immensely important and resource-consuming programs, including new jobs regularly imposed by Congress without any additional resources. With less FBI agents than the Chicago Police Department has sworn officers, the immensely important responsibilities of the FBI are not proportionally represented in its most basic resource -- soldiers. Again, this is not by way of criticism. I do not think that at the time the national priority existed for the resources that are needed for this critical need. And I hope that they do now. I would urge you to significantly increase the personnel of the FBI and to favorably consider pending legislation that would more fairly compensate them for the life-saving work they do every day. Further, it is critical that we fully support, and demonstrate that support, for our FBI agents and CIA officers. One example how we could do this better can be found in a recommendation by the National Commission on Terrorism. It noted, quote, "The risk of personal liability arising from actions taken in an official capacity discourages law enforcement and intelligence personnel from taking bold actions to combat terrorism. FBI special agents and CIA officers are buying personal liability insurance, which provides for private representation in some suits. By recent statute, federal agencies must reimburse up to one half of the cost of personal liability insurance for law enforcement officers and managers or supervisors." We need to support the brave men and women whom we ask to take great risks for us every day. The FBI was focused both on preventing domestic and foreign terrorist attacks. And I take exception to the finding that we were not sufficiently paying attention to terrorism at home. As I stated earlier, and as reflected in the Strategic Report and the Five-Year Report, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by foreign terrorists clearly demonstrated the effort to target America and Americans. Osama bin Laden's 1998 fatwah, calling for the deaths of Americans anywhere, left no doubt that terrorist attacks within the United States were as likely as those in Saudi Arabia, East Africa, Yemen and elsewhere. More convincingly, the failed efforts by Ressam, and his New York City-based co-conspirators, to carry out a major terrorist attack within the United States at the end of 1999 made the FBI focus intently on protecting homeland security. Indeed, the FBI investigation of the USS Cole attack and CIA efforts overseas led to our conclusion that the millennium attacks by Ressam on the West Coast were planned to coincide with other Al Qaida sponsored attacks in Jordan and in Yemen. The Jordanian attack was prevented by the CIA, acting together with the Jordanian Intelligence Service. The Al Qaida suicide bombers of the USS Cole had previously planned to attack another United States warship -- the USS Sullivans -- which was docked at the same fuel pod the USS Cole used in October 2000. The earlier attack was postponed because the bomb-laden attack boat sunk when it was launched. So before the end of 1999, the FBI and the intelligence community clearly understood the foreign-based Al Qaida threat regarding targets within the United States. Congress and the Executive were fully briefed as to this threat analysis, particularly the leadership and membership of these committees in hearings, briefings, stoofree (ph) calls late at night and over the weekend were continuously apprised of this threat. FREEH: In several appearances before this committee, I used a chart to depict the locations around the United States where radical fundamentalists cells were active. The FBI fought unsuccessfully to continue fingerprinting and photographing visiting nationals from key state sponsors of terrorism states because of our concern that intelligence agents were being sent here to support these radical elements within America. The notion that the FBI, other law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice and the intelligence community were not focused on homeland threats is not accurate and belied by many factors. For example, as we prepared for and conducted the several, major trials of Al Qaida members -- Osama bin Laden, remember, was charged as a defendant in those indictments in New York City during 1999 to 2000 -- extraordinary security steps were taken to prevent an Al Qaida attack. If any of you saw Foley Square, the federal courthouse and the area around City Hall, 26 Federal Plaza and the New York Police Department during this time, it was totally fortified. The closed streets, cement trucks, barricades, checkpoints and hundreds of heavily armed officers and agents were not set up to prevent the Al Qaida subjects from escaping from the courthouse. These unprecedented security measures -- enhanced after September 11 -- were designed to stop Al Qaida attacking the court, which found their own members guilty of blowing up our embassies in Africa. Similarly, Pennsylvania Avenue was ordered closed by the national security advisor and the White House after the United States Secret Service director and I made a presentation which showed that a terrorist vehicle bomb could destroy the West Wing. Prior to September 11, an incredible number of innovative and costly measures were regularly implemented by the FBI and the law enforcement community around the country -- at special events, conventions, inaugurations, public gatherings -- to prevent, among other threats, foreign based terrorists like Ressam and Yousef from attacking targets here. The radical fundamentalist threat posed a clear and present danger here, and everyone knew it and understood it to be the same. At the same time, the FBI was critically focused and active regarding the terrorist threat to Americans overseas. Much of that activity I have recounted above. Beginning in 1993, shortly after I became director, I determined that to protect America at home, the FBI needed to significantly increase its international role and liaison with our foreign law enforcement and security counterparts. I determined that to have an effective counterterrorism program that protected Americans in their homes and offices, the FBI had to have its agents in Cairo, Islamabad, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Riyadh and other critical locations around the world. We opened FBI legat offices in those countries to strengthen our counterterrorism program. The critical alliances and partnerships with the law enforcement and security services in those countries has paid enormous benefits and has protected this nation and our people from acts of terrorism. We later were able to open FBI legat offices in Amman, Almaty, New Delhi. When I left the FBI in June of '01, I had pending requests to establish FBI offices in 13 additional countries, having already more than doubled the FBI presence overseas. I was pleased recently to learn that my prior requests to open offices in Tunis, Kuala Lumpur, Tbilisi, Sana and Abu Dhabi had been approved. The FBI must have this foreign presence and capability to have an effective counterterrorism policy. When I left the FBI, I had proposed that we establish an FBI training facility in Central Asia, as we had done in Budapest in 1996, and had begun in Dubai, to enhance our ability to establish liaison and critical points of contacts in those important regions. Many FBI personnel and I spent an enormous amount of time traveling overseas in order to establish an international counterterrorism capability. Because of that, in 1998, I was able to negotiate the return of two Al Qaida bombers from Kenya so they could be tried and convicted for the embassy bombings. In 2000, I met with President Musharraf in Pakistan and negotiated the availability of a critical witness in one of our major terrorist prosecutions. I briefed him on the indictment against Bin Laden regarding the 1998 embassy bombings and asked for his assistance in capturing him in Afghanistan. FBI Agents and a prosecutor from the United States Attorney's Office from the Southern District later returned to Pakistan to continue those efforts. In 1996, I met with Presidents Nazarbayev and Karimov of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, respectively, and discussed radical fundamentalist terrorism directed against the United States from Afghanistan and Iran. I asked for their help in fighting these threats to America. I traveled extensively, as did scores of FBI men and women, throughout the Mideast, Central Asia, Africa, the Persian Gulf and South America with a very primary objective of strengthening our counterterrorism program so we could protect Americans at home. Dozens of special agents went to places like the Triborder Area in South America, South East Asia, Africa, Greece, Georgia, Russia and many other places to carry out our counterterrorism mission. For example, these relationships have paid enormous benefits. When we were examining the forensic evidence from the USS Cole case, we discovered that the explosive used was possibly manufactured in Russia. Because the FBI had been working in Russia since 1994, I was able to call the FSB director and ask for assistance. His response was immediate. Russian explosive agents and experts provided the FBI with all the necessary forensic and expert information requested, helping the case immensely. The 1996 Khobar bombing investigation demonstrates the FBI's success and limitations in combating foreign-based terrorists who wage war against the United States. The FBI's 1996 Khobar bombing investigation is a prime example of the FBI's success in combating terrorism because of solid relationships with our foreign partners. It also points to the limitations in dealing with these acts strictly as criminal cases. After that devastating terrorist attack on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 United States Airmen and wounded hundreds more, the FBI was instructed to mount a full-scale criminal investigation. We immediately dispatched several hundred FBI personnel to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. And, supported by the armed forces, established a crime scene, interviewed available witnesses, obtained evidence and set out leads and a plan. Working in close cooperation with the White House, State Department, the CIA and Department of Defense, I made a series of trips to Saudi Arabia in order to further the FBI's investigation. Because the FBI's prior contacts with the Saudi police service, the Mabaheth, and Interior Ministry had been carried on from offices as far away as Rome and Cairo, the FBI lacked any effective liaison or relationship with its counterpart agencies in Riyadh. Fortunately, the FBI was able to forge an effective working relationship with the Saudi police and Interior Ministry. After several trips and meetings with the Saudi leadership and particularly, Prince Nayef, the Interior Minister, the FBI was granted permission to expand its presence and joint operational capability within the Kingdom. I was particularly fortunate to gain the trust and cooperation of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, who was critical in achieving the FBI's investigative objectives in the Khobar case. Due to Prince Bandar's forthcoming support and personal efforts, the FBI was able to establish an FBI office in Riyadh. Our Arabic- speaking special agent, who became the first FBI agent to be assigned to Saudi Arabia, quickly made critical liaison and relationships of trust -- were established between the FBI and the Mabaheth. Evidence and access to important witnesses were obtained, and excellent investigative support was furnished to various teams of FBI Agents who worked in Saudi Arabia to pursue the case. In one instance, Canadian authorities, acting on Saudi information, arrested a Khobar subject who was brought to the United States and thereafter sent by the attorney general to Saudi Arabia for prosecution. The cooperation the FBI received as a result of Princes Bandar and Nayef's personal intervention and support was unprecedented and invaluable. From time-to-time a roadblock or legal obstacle would occur, which was expected given the marked differences between our legal and procedural systems. Despite these challenges, the problems were always solved by the personal intervention of Prince Bandar and his consistent support for the FBI. The case almost faltered on the issue of the FBI's critical request for direct access to six Saudi nationals who were being detained in the Kingdom and who had admitted participation in the Khobar bombing. One of these subjects, who had been returned to Saudi Arabia from another country, had key information which would later implicate senior Iranian government officials as responsible for the planning, funding and execution of this attack. We needed direct access to these subjects because their admissions and testimony were critical to support our prosecution. Yet no FBI agent had ever been given such unprecedented access to a detained Saudi national, which access could potentially taint their prosecution under Islamic law -- for the same reasons the FBI would have been very reluctant to allow Saudi police officers to come to the United States and interview a subject under like conditions. Moreover, by making these witnesses directly available to the FBI, the Saudis understood that they would be helping to provide evidence that senior officials of the government of Iran were responsible for the Khobar attack. Despite these extremely sensitive and complex issues, the Saudis put their own interests aside to aid the FBI and the United States. Supported by Prince Bandar, Prince Nayef and the police and Crown Prince Abdullah, they decided to grant the FBI request to interview the detainees. Ambassador Wyche Fowler closely worked with me in this endeavor and we finally succeeded. Teams of FBI investigators were then able to have access to these critical detainees and full debriefings were conducted in Saudi Arabia. As a direct result of these and later direct interviews, the Department of Justice was able to return a criminal indictment in June 2001, charging 13 defendants with the murders of our 19 servicemen. The indictment was returned just days before the statute of limitations would have run on some of the criminal charges. This case could not have been made without the critical support and active assistance of Saudi Arabia and the State Department, through Ambassador Fowler. The direct evidence obtained strongly indicated that the 1996 bombings were sanctioned, funded and directed by senior officials of the government of Iran. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were shown to be culpable for carrying out the operation. The bombers were trained by Iranians in the Bakka Valley. Unfortunately, the indicted subjects who are not in custody remain fugitives, some of whom are believed to be in Iran. Khobar represented a national security threat far beyond the capability or authority of the FBI or Department of Justice to address. Neither the FBI director nor the attorney general could or should decide America's response to such a grave threat. While on the one hand, Khobar demonstrated the capability of the FBI, acting in cooperation with its foreign counterparts overseas, to work successfully under extremely complex conditions to pursue criminal cases, it also demonstrated that an act of war against the United States -- whether committed by a terrorist organization or by a foreign state -- can receive only a limited response by the FBI making a criminal case. Mr. Watson recounted a meeting that he and I had with you, Senator Shelby, and Senator Bob Kerry. We came up to brief you on the Khobar attack and how the FBI case was proceeding. And I remember very much as we discuss this -- you and Senator Kerry commended the FBI for working on this matter, but you also commented that the FBI was somewhat out of its depth combating an act of war much graver than merely a horrific crime. I never lost sight of that fact, and its truth is even more apparent after September 11. The FBI always viewed these investigations as secondary to any national security action and severely limited in their overall impact on a far away enemy such as Al Qaida. I always stressed that the FBI investigations were completely secondary to the needs of our national security. The National Commission on Terrorism made this point convincingly by using the pursuit of the Pan Am 103 case -- investigated by the FBI -- as an example of the more aggressive, national strategy needed against this scale of terrorism. I quote from the commission's finding -- "Law enforcement is designed to put individuals behind bars, but is not a particularly useful tool for addressing actions by states. The Pan Am 103 case demonstrates the advantages and limitations of the law enforcement approach to achieve national security objectives. The effort to seek extradition of the two intelligence operatives implicated most directly in the bombing gained international support for economic sanctions that a more political approach may have failed to achieve. The sanctions and the resulting isolation of Libya may have contributed to the reduction of Libya's terrorist activities. On the other hand, prosecuting and punishing two low-level operatives for an act almost certainly directed by Qadafi is a hollow victory, particularly if the trial results in his implicit exoneration," close quote. The commission concluded that, quote, "Iran remains the most active supporter of terrorism. The IRGC and MOIS have continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks." FREEH: "They also provide funding, training, weapons, logistical resources and guidance to a variety of terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ and PFLP-GC," close quote. The Commission noted that, quote, "In October 1999, President Clinton officially requested cooperation from Iran in the investigation of the Khobar bombing. Thus far, Iran has not responded. International pressure in the Pan Am 103 case ultimately succeeded in getting some degree of cooperation from Libya. The United States Government has not sought similar multilateral action in bringing pressure on Iran to cooperate in the Khobar Towers bombing investigation," close quote. We must always recognize the limitations inherent in a law enforcement response. As we see at this very moment in history, others, to include Congress, must decide if our national will dictates a fuller response. I'm going to skip the section on pages 89 to 102. I know, without objection, with respect to our information technology issues -- and say briefly there that we were far behind in our ability to acquire and have funded the information technology required by a competent law enforcement and counter-intelligence -- counterterrorism agency. There is a long history there. I have set it out for you. I take some responsibility for the delay. The good news is that when I left the FBI, we were on track to the full funding of the Trilogy Program, which this committee is well aware of and which will put us back in the race with respect to IT. In addition to IT, other critical technology assistance is required for the FBI to continue an effective war against terrorism. In 1994, as a result of the FBI's own initiative, Congress passed the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act -- CALEA. This critical statute was vital to ensuring that law enforcement could maintain the technical ability to conduct court-authorized electronic surveillance. Against tremendous opposition, the FBI persuaded Congress that this selectively-utilized technique was essential to working its most complex criminal and national security cases. Support from Chairman Leahy, Senator Hatch and many other members was critical in this legislation. The law simply allows the FBI to continue its court- controlled use of this capacity as the telecommunications world changes from an analog to digital network. It has taken most of the last eight years to fund and to implement CALEA and faster progress needs to be made. But CALEA simply permits the FBI to maintain court-approved access to digital communications and stored data. Another technical challenge called "encryption" then and now threatens to make court-authorized interception orders a nullity. Robust and commercially available encryption products are proliferating and no legal means has been provided to law enforcement to deal with this problem, as was recently done by Parliament in the United Kingdom. Terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals have been able to exploit this huge vulnerability in the public safety matrix. Many of you have heard me and others testify before you, over the years, about this problem. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the 50 State Attorneys General, the National Association of District Attorneys have all identified this problem as the most critical technology issue facing law enforcement. Many of you -- Chairman Goss, who is not here right now -- Representative Norm Dicks, Senator Kyl, Senator DeWine and Senator Feinstein, particularly, have provided outstanding leadership and gone to great lengths to address this problem. In 1998, HPSCI adopted a substitute bill to S. 909, which effectively addressed all of law enforcement public safety and terrorism-related concerns regarding encryption products. Unfortunately, this needed counterterrorism assistance was not enacted. As we know from Ramzi Yousef's encrypted computer files found in Manila, terrorists are exploiting this technology to defeat our most sophisticated methods to prevent their attacks. I have long said, and repeat here, today, that this unaddressed problem creates a huge vulnerability in our nation's counterterrorism program. Neither the PATRIOT Act, nor any likely-to-be-enacted statute at this time, even attempts to close this gap. Resolving this issue is critical for homeland security. In 1995, Congress authorized the FBI to establish a Technical Support Center. The purpose of this facility was to provide federal and local law enforcement with the technical tools to improve court- authorized telecommunication interceptions and signal access for investigative purposes. I was pleased to see that this critical center was fully funded subsequent to September 11. Many other critical technology needs must be addressed both with legal authorization, such as the once-proposed Cyberspace Electronic Security Act bill, and significant new resources for counterterrorism, cyberterrorism and dealing with weapons of mass destruction and proliferation. Unfortunately, the convergence of technology and globalization now enable an individual terrorist or a small group of terrorists, operating from the other side of the world in a protected sanctuary, or operating in our backyard -- enables them to threaten our nation in devastating ways. I think we need to acknowledge that the rules governing the FBI's counterterrorism efforts changed as a result of September 11. We must acknowledge that the rules are changed beginning with certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. The Department of Justice and the intelligence agencies have been given new tools, as the statute is entitled, to combat a dangerous enemy who follows no rules. Some of these new authorities have been granted by the Congress with a sunset provision. Some asserted by the government are being challenged in the courts, where they will ultimately be decided. It must always be understood that prior to September 11, the FBI, as it always must, followed the rules as they were given to us by the attorney general and the Congress. For example, FBI Agents were not permitted without special circumstances to visit a suspect group's web site or to attend its public meetings. Counterintelligence, domestic terrorism and informant guidelines promulgated years ago, and updated with new restrictions, curtailed our ability to collect information in national security cases. Those guidelines are now being changed. Primary purpose requirements for FISA applications and information separation structures limited the sharing of criminal and intelligence information. Grand jury and Title 3 secrecy provisions severely restricted the dissemination of criminal terrorist information obtained during those processes. I repeatedly testified before Congress that FBI agents were statutorily barred from obtaining portions of credit reports on national security subjects when used car dealers could order them and read them. Before we interviewed detained foreign national Al Qaida subjects in East Africa in connection with the East African bombings, FBI agents duly gave them their Miranda rights. And when I left the FBI in June of 2001, we were being criticized in some quarters because a valuable new electronic tool necessary to read a terrorist's e-mail, pursuant to a court order, had the hypothetical potential to be abused, as any law enforcement tool could be. Everyone understands why and how some of the rules changed after September 11. But it is important to understand that the rules were changed by changed circumstances and that those circumstances changed the standards and expectations of both the FBI and the CIA. During my tenure as FBI director, I was immensely proud of the cooperation and integration of FBI and CIA efforts to combat terrorism. Myself and recent DCIs, particularly George Tenet, have taken bold and unprecedented steps to work together and forge an effective FBI-CIA partnership to combat terrorism. Exchanging senior officers, standing up the joint Osama bin Laden-Al Qaida operations and intelligence center, fully coordinating our legat and station chiefs, cross-training and many additional measures were taken to integrate our counterterrorism resources and capabilities. Our joint efforts in the East Africa bombings is a template of how successful we were in working together. Some of these efforts cannot be described in this session. This historical and successful integration does not mean that on every point of intersection, a lapse did not occur. But to focus on those isolated instances, while ignoring the huge successes of this top-down directed integration, is misplaced. I personally credit George Tenet with making this happen and winning the trust and respect of the entire FBI in the process. The best confirmation, by the way, of this fully integrated FBI- CIA counterterrorism effort is the fact that during my tenure no chairman or member of this committee ever raised with me, or the DCI, to my knowledge, the issue of our agencies being uncooperative or adverse to working together. Conversely, it was repeatedly pointed out to me by your committees that the FBI and CIA were working together in an exemplary manner. I would end with some recommendations. One -- provide legal authority and significant new funding enabling the FBI to manage encryption technology. Two -- significantly increase the number of FBI special agents and support positions with sufficient compensation required to recruit and retain the best men and women to combat terrorism. Three -- significantly increase the FBI's technical support program and facilitate the FBI's access to emerging technologies and research and development by the private sector. Four -- significantly increase the number and staffing of FBI legat offices overseas. Five -- exempt the FBI from the compensation restrictions of Title 5. Six -- change the FBI's procurement procedures to facilitate the efficient design and acquisition of equipment and technology. Seven -- provide new funding for the FBI's international training programs and put the FBI in charge of all international law enforcement training. Eight -- fund whatever it takes to achieve interoperability between all the agencies engaged in the war against terrorism. Nine -- restructure the budget to give more flexibility to the DCI, attorney general and the FBI director to better allocate program funding and resources as missions evolve and new threats emerge. Ten -- consider establishing a domestic public safety office in the Executive with responsibility for coordinating and supporting national law enforcement issues. Finally, enhance the legal, technical and funding resources of the FBI rather than consider creating an intelligence agency to share its domestic, pubic safety responsibilities. In conclusion, the FBI and CIA working together have accomplished much in fighting terrorism at home and abroad, but it is a constant and continuing battle. These agencies should remain the primary counterterrorism agencies for this mission. The DCI's authority for coordinating and implementing government-wide efforts in this regard should be expanded. The war against terrorism must be waged relentlessly. It will require that significantly more resources be allocated to the FBI and CIA. These fine agencies and the brave men and women who fight this war cannot defeat some forms of terrorism without total government intervention no matter how great and heroic their efforts. Al Qaida-type organizations, state sponsors of terrorism like Iran, and the threats they pose to America are beyond the competence of the FBI and the CIA to address. America must maintain the will in some cases to use its political, military and economic power in response when acts of war are threatened or committed against our nation by terrorists or their state sponsors. Finally, however treacherous the enemy, the FBI must fight this war as a law enforcement agency of the Department of Justice, governed by the Rule of Law and the Constitution. The rules, statutes and guidelines which establish the legal authorities of the FBI may change, as they did significantly after September 11, as long as those changes are clearly defined and understood. The FBI's adherence to the Constitution and the Rule of Law must not change. We do not have to sacrifice our freedoms to protect us. Thank you. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Freeh. Ms. White? WHITE: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you in this very important joint inquiry. It goes without saying that the terrorist attacks of September 11 profoundly affected and changed each one of us, and our nation, forever. But the most grievously impacted are, obviously, the loved ones of those who were so wantonly murdered that day, without warning. It is to them that we most owe whatever answers there are to be found for how it happened and the assurance that we, as a government, have done and will continue to do everything in our power to prevent such human devastation from ever happening again. My limited knowledge on this very complex subject of international terrorism -- I am honored to share with you for whatever use it may be to your inquiry. I have submitted a written statement, which has been made part of the record. And I will just, in my oral comments, highlight a few of the points in the written statement. I would then be pleased, this afternoon, to answer any questions the committee has of me today or in the future, as your work goes forward. To give just a little bit of context to start, let me describe, briefly, the international terrorism investigations and prosecutions of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. WHITE: From the beginning of my tenure as United States Attorney, in June 1993 through its last day in January of 2002, I, together with a number of extraordinarily dedicated and talented assistant United States attorneys, agents and detectives from the FBI- New York City Police Department Joint Terrorist Task Force -- JTTF -- were actively involved in the investigation prosecution of international terrorists and terrorist organizations who were plotting to attack or had actually attacked Americans and American interests both in the United States and abroad. No work in our office had a higher priority. International terrorism work of the Southern District of New York United States Attorney's Office began with the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, in which six people were killed and over 1,000 injured. The work also included the investigation and eventual indictment Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al Qaida terrorist network, indicted first in June 1998 for conspiracy, under seal, before he or Al Qaida had massively attacked anyone. A copy of that indictment is included with my statement, Mr. Chairman. Bin Laden and 22 other defendants were subsequently indicted in November of 1998 for their role in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa on August 7, 1998, in which 224 totally innocent people, including 12 Americans, lost their lives. In addition to the prosecution of those who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, and those who bombed our embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, the Southern District of New York United States Attorney's Office also successfully prosecuted approximately 20 additional terrorist defendants for their roles in three other major terrorist plots, which were, fortunately, thwarted by law enforcement -- the 1993 Day of Terror Plot to blow up government buildings and other structures in New York City; the 1994 Manila Air Plot to blow up a dozen jumbo jets flying back to America from the Far East; and then the December 1999 Millennium Plot Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian terrorist, trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan to detonate a bomb at the Los Angeles airport. In 2001, the Seattle United States Attorney's Office successfully prosecuted Ressam and the Southern District of New York Office successfully prosecuted to defendants who, from New York, provided material assistance to Ressam's plot in the form of money, credit cards and phony identification papers. In all, the Southern District of New York United States Attorney's Office charged and convicted over 30 defendants for international terrorism and there were no acquittals. All of the defendants are serving life or very lengthy prison sentences, without the possibility of parole. Ther |