Documents From
Congress' Joint Inquiry into 9/11
Transcript
of hearing
18 Sept 2002
see more documents from Congress' 9/11 Inquiry
|
Joint House And Senate Select Intelligence Committee
CHAIRMAN HOLDS HEARING ON 9/11 FAILURES SPEAKER: LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. WITNESSES: STEPHEN PUSH, SPOUSE OF 9/11 VICTIM BODY:
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY (R-AL)
We who are privileged to serve in the Senate think of our colleagues and staff as a family. And the Senate family, especially those of the Select Committee on Intelligence, suffered a special loss. Terry Lynch (ph) who had turned 49 one week before the attacks was married and the father of two beautiful daughters, Tiffany Marie (ph) and Ashley Nicole (ph). For more than two decades, he was a public servant. He spent several years on the bipartisan staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, where he was our expert on Middle Eastern affairs. In 1999, Terry left government service and became a consultant. On September the 11th, 2001, Terry was attending a meeting at the Pentagon on the subject of extending military survivor benefits to military families. Every day, Terry's family and the Senate family mourn his loss. And we have him on our minds and hearts today as we begin the public hearing phase of the joint inquiry committee's review of those events of September 11th. Like all Americans, we now realize that terrorism is no longer something that happens "over there" to people on the other side of the globe. Terrorism can hurt people close to us, here at home. In the days after September 11th, many were quick to blame the success of the terrorists' diabolical plot on failures of intelligence or preparedness. These public hearings are part of our search for truth, not to point fingers but to pin blame, but with the goal of identifying and correcting whatever systemic problems might have prevented our government from detecting and disrupting Al Qaida's plot. The public hearings follow a series of ten closed hearings, including one held on September 12. It is our task here to fulfill our oversight responsibility and to recommend reforms. We will follow the facts wherever they lead to provide answers to the American people and to improve our nation's security. While there have been many congressional investigations of significant events in our nation's history, including the several inquiries that followed Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, this is the first time in the history of the Congress that two permanent committees have joined to conduct a bicameral investigation. The Joint Inquiry Committee has hired an independent staff, negotiated with the executive branch over access to documents and witnesses and coordinated with the federal judiciary to assure that our public hearings will not interfere with pending prosecutions. I congratulate my colleagues from the Senate and the House and our staff for their commitment and determination to fulfill our obligation to the American people. I am very pleased with our progress today. As we enter the public hearing phase of the inquiry, our purpose is to inform the American people of our findings and to continue exploring what reforms will be necessary to reduce the chances of another terrorist attack on our homeland. As we said in the preamble to the scope of inquiry statement that the committee adopted in April, our review is designed to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks, to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families, and many Americans, have raised, and to lay the basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of the government. To reach those ends, our inquiry is focusing on three key areas. One, the evolution of the terrorist threat to the United States, and our government's awareness of and response to that threat. GRAHAM: It is important that we gain an understanding of how terrorist organizations, particularly Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida, move from being a relatively insignificant threat to American interests just a decade ago to their status today as America's number one threat. Second, what the intelligence community and the active consumers of the government's intelligence knew, or should have known, prior to September 11th about the scope and nature of possible attacks on U.S. interests by international terrorists. By examining how and when the government recognized this evolving threat, and how it responded to that threat, we will gain insights into the ways that we need to respond to terrorism. Clearly, this is not a static threat, but a rapidly changing and accelerating danger to America. Three, how the agencies that make up our intelligence community interact with one another, as well as with other federal, state and local agencies with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing and coping with international terrorist threats, including biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear. The ultimate question we will seek to answer is this, "How can we use the information that we discover during the inquiry to recommend, and then to successfully advocate to the American people and our colleagues, changes in the intelligence community that will reduce the prospects of another September 11?" In this first open hearing, we will hear from two representatives of the groups that speak for the families of the victims of September 11th. Kristin Breitweiser is co-founder of September 11th Advocates. Stephen Push is co-founder and treasurer of Families of September 11th. They have been asked to speak to us about the impact of September 11th on their families and America, as well as what reforms of the intelligence community will guard us against future threats. We will then have the first of several presentations from the joint inquiry committee's very capable staff, led by Ms. Eleanor Hill (ph). Ms. Hill (ph) is a former prosecutor, a veteran congressional investigator, a former inspector general of the Department of Defense. We are extremely fortunate to have a person of her experience and capabilities as the committee staff director. Ms. Hill (ph) will review the work of the joint inquiry committee over the last six months, including the ten closed hearings, interviews with nearly 500 individuals, and a review of more than 400,000 documents. Following her presentation, members of the joint inquiry committee will be recognized for comments and questions. In future open hearings, we will hear from customers of intelligence, including representatives of the Defense and State Departments, front-line personnel from intelligence agencies, and then key leaders of the intelligence community, including the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I now recognize Congressman Porter Goss, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chairman of the joint inquiry committee for opening remarks. I am extremely pleased to have Congressman Goss as a partner in this effort. Congressman Goss will be followed by Senator Richard Shelby, vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and then by Representative Nancy Pelosi, ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Congressman Goss. GOSS: Thank you, Chairman Graham. I'm pleased to associate myself with your remarks, and I'm honored to serve with you as co- chairman of this joint effort. Looking back at the innocent lives lost and the damage inflicted by a fanatical band of suicidal extremists has been very painful for all of us. We all experienced that just a week ago with the remembrances of 9/11, and I think it's fair to say that every American is incensed. We need to understand the hows and the whys of what happened to bring some comfort to those who are still grieving, and there are many, and to ensure the wellbeing of Americans at home and abroad as we go about our lives today and tomorrow in the globe, as it exists. And I want to thank Ms. Breitweiser and Mr. Push for being with us today and sharing with others, and I know there are others in the audience who are with them. You put a human face on the tragedy that we all feel. The people whose lives were unfairly ripped from them is way down deep what drives this committee to follow the facts to find the truth and you should know that. Your contribution today, representing so many who have lost so much, reminds us how the impact of September 11th is very profound and very personal across our land, and in fact, around the world. Providing your thoughtful, specific suggestions for what we can do better and asking penetrating questions is a help to us, and I know your testimony has questions and suggestions. I suppose everybody has a tragic story about pain and suffering related to September 11th. Mine is about CeeCee Lyles, a flight attendant on Flight 93, CeeCee was a resident of Ft. Myers, Florida, in my district. She was a former police patrol officer and detective, and she spent six years risking her life to protect others in that job. GOSS: In December, 2000, mindful of her young children and looking for a less dangerous and wearing career, although I'm not sure that was a way to characterize flight attendant work, she enrolled in a flight attendant school and began flying for United out of Newark. At 9:58 on September 11th, 2001, CeeCee called her husband Lorne (ph), a police officer in Fort Myers, from the plane to tell him that her flight had been hijacked. Her words, "I called to tell you I love you. Tell the kids I love them." Her last words that we know of are, "I think they're going to do it. They're forcing their way into the cockpit." And then the call broke off. We here owe a particular debt of gratitude to CeeCee Lyles and her companions on Flight 93, which was heading towards Washington when it crashed in Shanksville. The president of the United States has told us intelligence is the first line of defense. We know that he's right. We know the first line of defense has to be strong. These hearings will hopefully lead us to capabilities that better fit the threat as it does exist today and make our first line of defense stronger, which obviously it must be. We've already started this process in the oversight committees of intelligence, and I want to compliment all the members of the committees, particularly Representatives Saxby Chambliss and Jane Harman for the excellent report their subcommittee on terrorism has already provided us on the House side. It's been a useful building block to help our Joint Committee staff, a group I would describe as small in number but dynamic in impact. Under the leadership of Eleanor Hill (ph), they have interviewed a multitude of people, as the chairman has said, read thousands of documents and asked a great many questions, always with the steady hand of the members and the staffs of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to back them up. What this all means is that we have well over 100 professionals and some 37 members dealing with mountains of information. And these mountains are getting bigger every day. Every time we track down another terrorist cell, conduct another raid, through interrogation or documentation exploitation and other leads, we find out more about the enemy, and of course, how to stop them. There will be further chapters as the war on terrorism unfolds. We will incorporate as many as we can in our final report of this joint effort, and I predict there will be plenty of work for the other standing committees of jurisdiction in Congress because our primary focus has been intelligence, and there has been more than just intelligence involved in this situation. What forms further investigations take we'll leave to the future and concentrate now on finishing our work as completely, as accurately and expeditiously as possible. The terrorist threat remains high. I want to emphasize that it is precisely because we want to save lives in the future that we must be careful how we present and discuss this information in public. It's true, it may be axiomatic, the enemy is listening to us today. We must protect our sources and methods, and we must not reveal any of our plans and intentions to our enemies, those who would harm us. So today, we begin the process of open hearings with the understanding not everything can be discussed in this forum, as much as we would like to share it with America, but that much can and should be explained to our nation, which is our goal. And we will go as far as we can. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. (UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman? GRAHAM: Senator Shelby. (UNKNOWN): Could I ask a question, a procedural question? GRAHAM: Yes. Senator, (inaudible). (UNKNOWN): Could you inform us as to how we're going to proceed in terms of members' participation? GRAHAM: Yes. After we complete the opening statements, we will then hear from the representatives of the families then Ms. Eleanor Hill (ph) will present a report on the work of the Joint Inquiry Committee to date, after which members will be recognized for questions of Ms. Hill (ph) and any comments they wish to make. (UNKNOWN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GRAHAM: Thank you, Senator. SHELBY: Mr. Chairman, thank you. We now know that our inability to detect and prevent the September 11th attacks was an intelligence failure of unprecedented magnitude. Some people who couldn't seem to utter the words intelligence failure are now convinced us. Many of us also knew that an accounting would have to be made on behalf of the innocent victims, the families left behind, and the American people. After all, there were nine separate investigations into the attack on Pearl Harbor and the intelligence failures attendant there. We agreed, however, that some time would have to pass before we began on the committees such an effort, because we were at war and it was our top priority to ensure its success. Approximately six months after that fateful September day, our two committees joined together in what I hoped would be a thorough and comprehensive examination of the United States intelligence community's failures to detect and to prevent the attacks of September the 11th. Now, approximately six months later, we're making progress, but we are far from done, and I am concerned. The staff has reviewed many thousands of documents, but they have many thousands yet to review. They have interviewed many people, but there are many people yet to interview. In fact, it's still very difficult even to determine how far we've come, and almost impossible to tell how far we've yet to go. I've been part of many investigations in my career, but none has been as important as this one. Almost 3000 Americans have been murdered, and perhaps thousands more innocent lives will hang in the balance every day. This investigation, I believe, must be thorough, comprehensive, and complete. I want it to be a success. But to be a success, an inquiry needs time and resources. If you limit either one, your chances of success diminish significantly. Unfortunately, I believe we have a short supply of both in this inquiry, and I'm afraid that we're beginning to reap the results. SHELBY: From the outset, I argued strongly that we should avoid setting arbitrary deadlines. are an invitation to stonewalling and foot-dragging, and we've some of both in this effort. I've also said many times that agencies under the congressional microscope are generally not motivated to cooperate. That's just common sense, that's human nature. To be thorough, I believe we must be able to identify and to locate relevant information, retrieve it, analyze it in the context of all of the other information we've gathered. This is inevitably difficult and time consuming. Because we have only one to three staffers actually focused on any particular agency at any one time, and because so much of our joint inquiry staff resources are tied up in producing hearings such as this one, which I deem important, it is becoming exceedingly difficult to be as thorough and probing, I believe, as we need to be. I'm afraid we've asked the joint staff to move a mountain and perhaps only given them a couple of shovels and a little over six months to get it done. I hope it's enough, but I'm concerned. This is a massive undertaking, and I compliment our chairmen, Senator Bob Graham and Congressman Porter Goss for their leadership, because anyone who has willingly, voluntarily, to lead and to coordinate an effort such as this deserves our admiration and our support, and perhaps, our condolences. But I'm concerned that the management challenges that you faced and continue to face have created some fundamental flaws in our process. Many members of our joint committee have found it exceedingly difficult to get information about the inquiry. They're frustrated by what a lot of them perceive to be efforts to limit their ability to participate in this inquiry fully. They want to support and ultimately to endorse this effort that we have undertaken, but they will be unable to do so, I believe, unless they have a clear and unfettered view of the activities of the joint staff. At this point, I don't believe they do. Today, Eleanor Hill, our staff director, will present a summary of a statement intended to reflect the current state of our inquiry. Members, however, have had essentially no involvement with the process that led to its drafting, and therefore have little idea, as a whole, whether what it says is accurate or a fair and thorough representation of what has been discovered. Mr. Chairmen (ph), I'm not saying that it is not accurate or thorough, hopefully, it is both. I'm saying that our members, as they've voiced to me, have no practical of way of knowing. These are concerns that we've discussed before in the four of us meeting, and they will need to be resolved if we're to have any chance of reaching a consensus at the conclusion of this inquiry. I think it's important that the American people know where we stand as we begin to discuss publicly why their multi-billion dollar intelligence community was unable to detect and prevent the worst single attack on American soil in our history. At this point, again, I'm very concerned that we may not have the time or resources we set out to do. I will continue to support this effort, and support our chairmen, but there may come a day very soon when it will become apparent that ours must be only a prelude to further inquiries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator. Congresswoman Pelosi. PELOSI: Good morning, Mr. Chairmen. I want to join you in welcoming today's very important witnesses. I commend the two of you for your great leadership in doing the best possible job under the circumstances to get to the bottom of all of this, and I associate myself with the remarks of our distinguished chairmen and the priority we place in the participation of the members of the family. When we began our joint inquiry eight months ago, we began with a moment of silence. We did this in recognition of the tremendous tragedy that had befallen us, the gravity of the responsibility we faced, and the obligation we had to the families of those who lost their lives. Today, it is appropriate that we begin our first public hearing of this joint committee and this inquiry -- be viewed with the presentation of the families. PELOSI: It is important that this inquiry be viewed through the prism of the families of the victims of this terrible tragedy that occurred at the World Trade Center, at the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania. The dignity shown by the thousands of family members has been an inspiration to our country and a tribute to their loved ones. They have risen to the occasion that they never could have imagined, and their strength has lifted the spirit of all Americans. In welcoming our witnesses here today, I want to express the appreciation I know that every American feels towards them. The appreciation of the depth of their grief we can only imagine, but we do appreciate their leadership which has sprung from that sadness. To Kristin Breitweiser, the co-chairman of September 11th Advocates, which is helping other families, and to Stephen Push, co-founder of Families of September 11th, and all the members of the families, thank you for your courage. All of America has been touched by this tragedy, as we all know, none more directly than all of you. However, we have some of us a closer association because of our work at the Pentagon, members of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intelligence lost their lives when they went to work to work to protect our country. Little did they know that they would lose their lives at the Pentagon doing that. And of course, Mike Spann was the first American killed in conflict in the -- in our struggle to root out terrorism wherever it is. And his association with the intelligence community is one that I wish to acknowledge. As we address the challenge September 11th presented to our country -- and I also want to mention Betty Ang (ph), a flight attendant on the plane that went into the World Trade Center. She was on Flight 11. She was one of my constituents in San Francisco. Her courage enabled her to keep communicating with the ground until the last possible moment. There are so many, many stories, and we know that there are at least 324 of them directly. We identify New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, but on those planes, one of which was destined for San Francisco, there were people from all over the country whose lives were touched. As we address the challenge of September 11th that it presents to our country, we're walking on hallowed ground, respecting the sacrifice of those who died and ensuring the families that justice will be done. We must find answers, reduce risk to the American people and comfort the families. Families of those affected by September 11th talk of their continuing reactions to events that used to be no cause for concern. For some family members, every time a plane flies overhead, we have been told, they experience deep fear. We must remove that fear. We are all united in our determination to win the war against terrorism. We all agree that this battle will be won and that we will succeed by working together. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have a responsibility to ensure that Congress conducts a thorough assessment of the performance of the intelligence agencies leading up to, and including, September 11th. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we must protect sources and methods, but we must conduct our inquiry in the most open way possible, that information that can be made available to the public, and especially to the families, is made available. Only in the case of protecting sources and methods should it be withheld, not in the case of protecting reputations or to avoid embarrassment to some. The committees have decided that the best way to do our inquiry is to work cooperatively in a bipartisan manner on an inquiry conducted by the House and the Senate, as you know. And here we are today with our first public hearing. A joint investigation is an unusual step, but the events of September 11th call for unusual measures. I join both of our chairmen in commending our colleagues, the members of the House and the Senate on the committees for their diligence and their reverence for the subject that we are dealing with. Our purpose is not to assign blame but to identify areas that could lessen the chance that another September 11th could happen. We must do everything we can to prevent another terrible tragedy. In doing so, we will balance the need to enhance physical security for Americans with the duty to preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The martyrs of September 11th gave their lives because of those freedoms. The goal of terrorists is to instill fear. That fear can change the way of life for a society. We cannot let them have that victory. We can and we must do things in a way that respects our people, protects our founding principles, and protects and defends our communities. The words of "America the Beautiful" ring true in describing the great cities of Washington, D.C., New York, and indeed, the nation. "Oh beautiful, for patriot dream that sees beyond the years. Thine alabaster cities gleam, undimmed by human tears." PELOSI: Today, those tears are fresh, but this is America, land of the free, and as the martyrs and their families have shown us, home of the brave. We will take all the time that is needed. We will pursue every angle. We will turn every stone to find answers for the family. And I hope that in all that we do in this joint inquiry, and in rooting out the terrorism and finding the perpetrators of this tragedy, that our work says to the families, "Peace be with you." Thank you, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms. Pelosi. We are honored today to be joined by representatives of the families of the victims. We understand the pain that you have suffered over the last year. We can empathize, but you represent an invaluable perspective and an insight into the full meaning of this tragedy, and the responsibilities that we all have to avoid the prospects of its repetition. We very much appreciate your sharing with us today. First, Ms. Kristin Breitweiser. BREITWEISER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I have a written statement to be made part of the record, and I would like to submit some supporting documentation. CHAIRMAN: Ms. Breitweiser, could you put the microphone -- yes, right in front. Good, thank you. BREITWEISER: That better? I will summarize my testimony as follows: I would like to thank the families of the 3000 victims for allowing me to represent them here today before the Joint Intelligence Committee. It is a tremendous honor. Testifying before this committee is a privilege and an enormous responsibility that I do not take lightly. I will do my best not to disappoint the families or the memories of their loved ones. Toward that end, I ask the members present here today to find in my voice the voices of all the family members of the 3000 victims of September 11th. I would also ask for you to see in my eyes the eyes of the more than 10,000 children who are left to grow up without the love, affection and guidance of a mother or a father who was tragically killed on September 11th. I would now like to thank the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Eleanor Hill and her staff for giving the families this opportunity to be heard. It has been an excruciating and overwhelming 12 months, and it is now time for our words and our concerns to be heard by you. My three-year-old daughter's most enduring memory of her father will be placing flowers on his empty grave. My most enduring member of my husband Ronald will be his final words to me. "Sweets, I'm fine, I don't want you to worry. I love you." Ron uttered those words while he was watching men and women jump to their deaths from the top of Tower One. Four minutes later, his tower was hit by United Flight 175. I never spoke to my husband again. I don't really know what happened to him. I don't know whether he jumped or he choked to death on smoke. I don't know whether he sat curled up in a corner watching the carpet melt in front of him, knowing that his own death was soon to come. Or if he was alive long enough to be crushed by the buildings when they ultimately collapsed. These are the images that haunt me at night when I put my head to rest on his pillow. I do know that the dream that I had envisioned, that I desperately needed to believe, that he was immediately turned to ash and floated up to the heavens, was simply not his fate. I know this because his wedding band was recovered from Ground Zero, with a part of his arm. The wedding band is charred and scratched, but still perfectly round and fully intact. I wear it on my right hand it will remain there until the day I die. September 11th was the devastating result of a catalogue of failures on behalf of our government and its agencies. My husband and the approximately 3000 others like him went to work that morning and never came home. BREITWEISER: But were any of our government agencies doing their job on that fateful morning? Perhaps the carnage and devastation of September 11th speaks for itself in answering this question. Our intelligence agencies suffered an utter collapse in their duties and responsibilities leading up to and on September 11th. But their negligence does not stand alone. Agencies like the Port Authority, the city of New York, the FAA, the INS, the Secret Service, NORAD, the Air Force and the airlines also failed our nation that morning. Perhaps said more cogently, one singular agency's failures do not eclipse another's. And it goes without saying that the examination of the intelligence agencies by this committee does not detract, discount, or dismantle the need for a more thorough examination of all of these other culpable parties. An independent, blue ribbon panel would be the most appropriate means to achieve such a thorough and expansive examination, in large part because it would not be limited in scope or hindered by time limits. An independent blue ribbon panel would provide a comprehensive, unbiased, and definitive report that the devastation of September 11th demands. Soon after the attacks, President Bush stated that there would come a time to look back and examine our nation's failures, but that such an undertaking was inappropriate while the nation was still in shock. I would respectfully suggest to President Bush and to our Congress that now, a full year later, it is time to look back and investigate our failures as a nation. A hallmark of democratic government is a willingness to admit to, analyze and learn from mistakes, and it is now time for our nation to triumph as the great democracy that it is. The families of the victims of September 11th have waited long enough. We need to have answers. We need to have accountability. We need to feel safe living and working in this great nation. On May 17th, 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice stated, "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile -- a hijacked airplane as a missile." Unquote. The historical facts illustrate differently. In 1993, a $150,000 study was commissioned by the Pentagon to investigate the possibility of an airplane being used to bomb national landmarks. A draft document of this was circulated throughout the Pentagon, the Justice Department, and to FEMA. In 1994, a disgruntled FedEx employee invaded the cockpit of a DC10 with plans to crash it into a company building. Again, in 1994, a lone pilot crashed a small plane into a tree on the White House grounds. Again, in 1994, an Air France flight was hijacked by members of the Armed Islamic Group with the intent to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower. In January, 1995, Philippine authorities investigating Abdul Murad, an Islamic terrorist, unearthed Project Bojinka (ph). Project Bojinka's (ph) primary objective was to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific. In the alternative, several planes were to be hijacked and flown into civilian targets in the United States. Among the targets mentioned were CIA headquarters, the World Trade Center, the Sears Tower, and the White House. Murad told U.S. intelligence officials that he would board any American commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger and that he would then hijack the aircraft, control its cockpit, and dive it at CIA headquarters. In 1997, this plot resurfaced during the trial of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Center. During the trial, FBI agents testified that, quote, "The plan targeted not only the CIA, but other U.S. government buildings in Washington, including the Pentagon," unquote. In September 1999, a report, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism," was prepared for U.S. intelligence by the Federal Research Division, an arm of the Library of Congress. It stated, quote, "Suicide bombers belonging to Al Qaida's martyrdom battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the CIA, or the White House." Again, that was in September, 1999. This laundry list of historical indicators, in no way exhaustive, illustrates that long before September 11th, the American intelligence community had a significant amount of information about specific terrorist threats to commercial airline travel in America, including the possibility that a plane would be used as a weapon. On March 11th, 2002, Director of the CIA George Tenet stated, quote, "In broad terms last summer that terrorists might be planning major operations in the United States, but we never had the texture, meaning enough information to stop what happened," unquote. On May 8th, 2002, Director of the FBI Robert Mueller stated, quote, "There was nothing the agency could have done to anticipate or prevent the attacks," unquote. Once again, the historical facts indicate differently. Throughout the spring and early summer of 2001, intelligence agencies flooded the government with warnings of possible terrorist attacks against American targets, including commercial aircraft, by Al Qaida and other groups. The warnings were vague, but sufficiently alarming to prompt the FAA to issue four information circulars to the commercial airline industry between June 22nd and July 31st warning of possible terrorism. On June 22nd, the military's second and European commands enforced force protection condition delta, the highest anti-terrorist alert. On June 28th, 2001, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice said, quote, "It is highly likely that a significant Al Qaida attack is in the near future within several weeks," unquote. As of July 31st, the FAA -- excuse me, the FAA urged U.S. airlines to maintain a quote, "high degree of alertness." One FAA circular from late July, 2001, noted, according to Condoleeza Rice, that there was, quote, "No specific target, no credible info of attack to U.S. civil aviation interests, but that terror groups are known to be planning and training for hijackings, and we ask you therefore to use caution." Two counter terrorism officials described the alerts of the early and mid-summer 2001 as quote, "the most urgent in decades," unquote. One thing remains clear from this history: Our intelligence agencies were acutely aware of an impending domestic risk posed by Al Qaida. A question that remains unclear is how many lives could have been saved had this information been made more public. Airport security officials could have gone over all the basics again of this depth needed to prevent hijackings. The policy allowing passengers to carry razors and knives with blades up to four inches in length certainly could have come under scrutiny. Indeed, officials could have issued an emergency directive prohibiting such potential weapons in carry-on bags. Finally, all selectees under the computer-assisted passenger prescreening system, and their carry-on luggage, and checked bags, could have been subjected to additional screening. BREITWEISER: Apparently, none were on September 11th, although internal FAA documents do indicate that caps selected some of the hijackers. And how many victims may have thought twice before boarding an aircraft? How many victims would have chosen to fly on private planes? How many victims would have taken notice of these Middle Eastern men while they were boarding their plane? Could these men have been stopped? Going further, how many vigilant employees would have chosen to immediately flee Tower Two after they witnessed the blazing inferno in Tower One if only they had known that an Al Qaida terrorist attack was imminent? Could the devastation of September 11th been diminished in any degree had the government's information been made public in the summer of 2001? On July 5th, the government's -- July 5th, 2001 -- the government's top counter terrorism official, Richard Clarke (ph) stated to a group gathered at the White House, "Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon." The group included the FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the INS. Clarke (ph) directed every counter terrorist office to cancel vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises, and place domestic rapid response teams on much shorter alert. For six weeks, last summer, at home and abroad, the U.S. government was at its highest possible state of readiness against imminent terrorist attack. A senior FBI official attending the White House meeting on July 5th, 2001, committed the Bureau to redouble contacts with its foreign counterparts and to speed up transcription and analysis of wiretaps obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act among other steps. But when the field agent in Phoenix, Arizona reported the suspicions of a hijacking plot just five days later, the FBI did not share the report with any other agency. One must ask, "Why?" That report, written by Agent Kenneth Williams, now well-known as the Phoenix Memo, recommended that the FBI investigate whether Al Qaida operatives were training at U.S. flight schools. Williams posited that Osama bin Laden followers might be trying to infiltrate the civil aviation system as pilots, security guards, or other personnel. He recommended a national program to track suspicious flight school students. Agent Williams was dead on point. But in the summer of 2001, while our nation was at its highest state of alert, his memo was flatly ignored. And what result if it hadn't been ignored? What if his memo was promptly paced on Intelink, Siprnet or Niprnet? What if other agents had the same suspicions in Florida, California, Georgia, Ohio, and Nevada? Could the terrorists have been stopped? On August 15th, 2001 an alert civilian instructor at a Minnesota flight school called the FBI and said, quote, "Do you realize that a 747 loaded with fuel can be a bomb?" The next day, Zacharias Moussaoui was arrested. After investigating Moussaoui's past, the FBI, with the help of French intelligence, learned that he had Islamic extremist connections. They also knew that he was interested in flight patterns around New York City, and that he had a strong desire to fly big jets, even though at the time he didn't have so much as a license to fly a Cessna. And then what happened? The FBI office in Minnesota attempted to get a FISA warrant, but they were rebuffed, a crucial mistake, because Zacharias Moussaoui's possessions contained evidence that would have exposed key elements of the September 11th plot. Why was this request denied? Again, the historical facts must be analyzed. In March, 2001, an internal debate ignited at the Justice Department and the FBI over wire-tap surveillance of certain terrorist groups. Prompted by questions raised by Royce C. Lamberth, the chief judge of the FISA court, the Justice Department opened an inquiry into Michael Resnik (ph), an FBI official who coordinated the ACTS (ph) applications. Attorney General John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, then deputy attorney general, ordered a full review of all foreign surveillance authorizations. Again, this was in March, 2001. Justice Department and FBI officials have since acknowledged the existence of this internal investigation and said that the inquiry forced officials to examine their monitoring of several suspected terrorist groups, including Al Qaida. And while senior FBI and Justice Department officials contend that the internal investigation did not affect their ability to monitor Al Qaida, other officials have acknowledged that the inquiry might have hampered electronic surveillance of terror groups. The matter remains highly classified. What is not classified is that in early September, a Minnesota FBI agent wrote an analytic memo on Zacharias Moussaoui's case, theorizing that the suspect could fly a plane into the World Trade Center. Tragically, this too was ignored. Also ignored by U.S. intelligence agencies was the enormous amount of trading activity on the Chicago Exchange Board and in overseas markets. BREITWEISER: Our intelligence agencies readily use PROMISE software to analyze these kinds of market indicators that presented themselves in the weeks prior to September 11th. Why were these aberrational trades and market swings ignored? We were at the highest state of alert, an attack by Al Qaida was expected to occur at any given moment, and yet massive amounts of trade occurred on American Airlines, United Airlines, reinsurance companies and lease holders in the World Trade Center, and none of our watchdogs noticed. Perhaps even more disturbing is the information regarding Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhamzi, two of the hijackers. In late August 2001, the CIA asked the INS to put these two men on a watch list because of their ties to the bombing of the USS Cole. On August 23rd, 2001, the INS informed the CIA that both men had already slipped into this country. Immediately thereafter, the CIA asked the FBI to find Al-Midhar and Alhamzi, not a seemingly hard task in light of the fact that one of them was listed in the San Diego phone book, the other took out a bank account in his own name, and finally we have to come find out recently that an FBI informant happened to be their roommate. But again, our intelligence agencies failed. It was only after the devastation of September 11th that our intelligence agencies seemed to get back on track. On September 12th, 2001, the New York Times reported, quote, "On Tuesday, a few hours after the attacks, FBI agents descended on flight schools, neighborhoods and restaurants in pursuit of leads. The FBI arrived at Huffman Aviation at about 2:30 a.m. Wednesday morning. They walked out with all of the school's records, including photocopies of the men's passports." The New York Times also reported that day that students at Embry- Riddle Aeronautical University said that, quote, "within hours of the attacks, FBI investigators were seen," at their school. How did the FBI know exactly where to go only a few hours after the attacks? How did they know which neighborhoods, which flight schools and which restaurants to investigate so soon in the case? The New York Times went on to report on September 12th that, quote, "Federal agents questioned employees at a store in Bangor, Maine, where five Arab men believed to be the hijackers, tried to rent cell phones late last week. Store employees at first refused to sell the phones because the men lacked proper identification, but they gave in after the five offered $3,000 cash employees to store employees, an airport official said." The September 12th article goes on to state, quote, "The men then phoned Bangor Airport trying to get a flight to Boston, but were told that there was no flight that matched their desired departure time. The men then phoned Portland International Jetport, where two of them apparently made reservations for a flight to Boston on Tuesday morning." How would this information be gleaned so quickly? How would the FBI know to visit a store in Bangor, Maine, only hours after the attacks? Moreover, how would they know the details of a phone conversation that occurred a week prior to the attacks? Were any of the hijackers already under surveillance? It has been widely reported that the hijackers ran practice runs on the airline routes that were chosen on September 11th. Did our intelligence agents every shadow these men on any of their prior practice runs? Furthermore, on September 12th, the New York Times reported that, quote, "Authorities said they had also identified accomplices in several cities who had helped plan and execute Tuesday's attacks. Officials said they knew who these people were and important biographical details about many of them. They prepared biographies of each identified member of the hijack teams, and began tracing the recent movements of the men." How are complete biographies of the terrorists, and their accomplices, created in such short time? Did our intelligence agencies already have open files on these men? Were they already investigating them? Could the attacks of September 11th been prevented? The speed by which the FBI was able to locate, assimilate and analyze a small amount of information so soon after the attacks, barely one day later, perhaps answers this question for itself. But if the terrorists were under investigation, then why were they ever permitted to board those planes? Perhaps even more potently, why, if such an investigation was already under way, was our nation so late in responding to the emergency that quickly unfolded that morning? Too many questions remain. Topping the list of unanswered questions are those that involve our nation's coordination, communication and response to the attacks that morning. The 24 hours that presented themselves on September 11th beg to be examined. Questions like, why did the New York Port Authority not evacuate the World Trade Center when they had an open phone line with Newark Traffic Control Center and were told that the second plane was bearing down on the South Tower? New York/New Jersey Port Authority had at last 11 minutes of notice to begin evacuations of the South Tower. An express elevator in the World Trade Center was able to travel from top to bottom in one minute's time. How many lives may have been saved had the Port Authority acted more decisively? Or rather, acted at all? Washington Air Traffic Control Center knew about the first plane before it hit the World Trade Center, yet the third plane was able to fly loop-the-loops over Washington, D.C., one hour and 45 minutes after Washington Center first knew about the hijacking. After circling in this restricted airspace, controlled and protected by the Secret Service, who had an open phone line to the FAA, how is it possible that that plane was then able to crash into the Pentagon? Why was the Pentagon not evacuated? Why was our Air Force so late in its response? What, if anything, did our nation do in a defensive military posture that morning? Three thousand innocent Americans were killed on September 11th, leaving behind families and loved ones like myself and my daughter. There are too many heartbreaking stories to recount. There are too many lost opportunities and futures to be told. But what can be said to you today is that the families continue to suffer each and every day. All we have are tears and a resolve to find the answers, because we continue to look into the eyes of our young children, who ask us, "Why?" We have an obligation, as parents and as a nation, to provide these young children with answers as to why their mother or father or aunt or uncle or grandmother or grandfather never returned from work that day. We need people to be held accountable for their failures. We need leaders with the courage to take responsibility for what went wrong. Mistakes were made, and too many lives were lost. We must investigate these errors so that they will never happen again. It is our responsibility as a nation to turn the dark events of September 11th into something from which we can all learn and grow and as a nation look forward to a safe future. BREITWEISER: In closing, I would like to add one thought. Undoubtedly, each of you here today, because you live and work in Washington, D.C., must have felt that you were in the bullseye on the morning of September 11th. For most of you, there was a relief at the end of that day, a relief that you and your loved ones were in safe hands. You were the lucky ones. In your continuing investigation, please do not forget those of us who did share in your good fate. Thank you. (APPLAUSE) CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms. Breitweiser for a moving, inspirational and highly motivating statement. Thank you. BREITWEISER: Thank you. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Stephen Push? PUSH: Chairmen Graham and Goss, Ranking Minority Members Shelby and Pelosi, and members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, I would like to thank you, and also thank the joint 9/11 inquiry staff, for the vital work that you have been doing to understand the problems of the intelligence agencies and take steps to correct them. I appreciate the hard work that you and your staff are doing to ensure that our loved ones have not died in vain. I would also like to thank you for inviting Kristin and me to testify before you today. I realize that your decision was not popular with the bureaucrats in the intelligence community, but the victims' families greatly appreciate the opportunity to have their voices heard on the important work of your inquiry. Our loved ones paid the ultimate price for the worst American intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor. I hope that Kristin and I can do justice to their sacrifice and contribute in some small way to preventing other families from experiencing the immeasurable pain that accompanies such a tragic loss. While I eagerly await the final report of your inquiry, one thing is already clear to me from the news reports about the intelligence failures that led to the attacks: If the intelligence community had been doing its job, my wife, Lisa Raines, would be alive today. She was a passenger on flight 77, the plane that was crashed into the Pentagon. I realize that preventing terrorism is a very difficult task, and that we will never achieve complete safety. But a series of missteps that defy common sense made the attack on the Pentagon possible. In January of 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency learned that two Saudi nationals, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Khalid Almidhar attended an Al Qaida meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Thanks to the infamous stovepiping of information in the intelligence community, these two men, who were to become two of the hijackers on flight 77, were not immediately placed on the terrorism watch list, and they were allowed to enter the United States. PUSH: Shortly after the bombing of the USS Cole in October of 2000, the CIA discovered that one of the men photographed with Alhazmi and Almihdhar in Kuala Lumpur was a suspect in the Cole attack. But still the two suspected terrorists in the United States did not appear on the watch list. The Federal Bureau of Investigation seems to have been unaware of him, even though they lived with an FBI informant during part of their time in this country. The two suspects were finally added to the watch list on August 23, 2000, but on September 11th, they were able to board flight 77 using their real names. I don't know why they called it a watch list; apparently no one was watching them. After the Kuala Lumpur meeting, Alhazmi had at least three meetings with Hani Hanjour, the terrorist believed to have piloted flight 77. I am convinced that had the CIA and the FBI displayed any initiative, Alhazmi, Almihdhar and Hanjour would have been apprehended. With the loss of three hijackers, including the pilot, flight 77 would not have been hijacked and the lives of the 184 people murdered in the Pentagon attack would have been saved. What's more, Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 conspiracy and the pilot of the first plane to hit the World Trade Center, attended one of the meetings between Alhazmi and Hanjour. Thus it's possible if not likely that surveillance of Alhazmi could have led to surveillance of Atta and discovery of the other terrorists involved in the conspiracy. In fact, the FBI, in an apparent attempt to pin the blame for 9/11 on the CIA, reportedly developed a chart that showed how timely access of the information about Alhazmi and Almihdhar would have enabled the FBI to foil the entire 9/11 plot. I won't belabor the argument about the possibility of preventing the 9/11 attacks. A number of intelligence experts have said that preventive work is easier said than done. I don't know if that's a fair excuse, but one conclusion is incontestable: The 9/11 attacks exposed serious shortcomings in the American intelligence community. Or to state this fact more precisely: The attack exposed these flaws to the wider public. Many of the flaws have been known to intelligence professionals, to your two committees and to a succession of commissions for years. In voicing these complaints it is not my intention to malign the field officers, agents, analysts, technicians and others serving their country in the intelligence agencies. I'm sure that most of them are very competent and dedicated people. But in many cases they seem to be stymied by a bloated, risk-averse and politicized intelligence bureaucracy that is more interested in protecting its turf than in protecting America. Initially, I thought 9/11 would be a wake-up call for the intelligence community, but I was mistaken. The intelligence agencies and the White House have asserted that no mistakes were made. They couldn't possibly have conceived that anyone would use commercial jets in suicide attacks on buildings. They asserted that Al Qaida is impossible to penetrate. Such a can't-do attitude is profoundly un-American. It also raises the question of why taxpayers should continue to spend tens of billions of dollars annually on the intelligence community if it cannot protect us. The following anecdote suggests that little has changed at the FBI since 9/11. Three years ago, a female flight attendant for an American airline was assaulted in flight in front of a witness by a male flight attendant wielding a knife that the female flight attendant described at the time as looking like a box cutter. The assailant had bragged to this flight attendant about how he regularly smuggled the knife past security. The woman reported the incident immediately, but the airline dropped the case without explanation. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the female flight attendant, noting the parallels between her assailant and the hijackers, reported the incident to the FBI. An agent interviewed her, but later told her that the FBI couldn't find the male flight attendant because he no longer worked for the airline. I had a private investigator, yesterday, do a search for me using public databases, and within a matter of a few hours he was able to tell me the current address of this male flight attendant and also report to me that he is indeed still an employee of the airline in question. Nearly a year later, the female flight attendant grew frustrated and asked her congressman to investigate. The congressman sent the request, including the original incident report describing the weapon and the assault, to FBI headquarters. PUSH: Within a few weeks the woman received a letter from the FBI explaining that the matter fell outside the bureau's jurisdiction. I find this response unacceptable, not only because assaulting an airline crew member in flight is a federal offense, but also because a violent man, who smuggles knives onto planes, should have received more attention from the FBI than this man apparently did. The time for incremental reform of the intelligence community ended on September 11th, 2001. The ossified intelligence bureaucracy must now be thoroughly restructured. If it isn't, the next attack may involve weapons of mass destruction, and the death toll may be in the tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands. I urge you, please, seriously consider making the following changes in the intelligence community. One, put someone in charge of intelligence. Stovepiping is an inevitable consequence of competition among agencies. Only a strong leader with authority over all of the intelligence agencies can force them to share information. In principle, this is the president's job, but he has limited time to spend on intelligence. There should be a Cabinet-level official with authority over all of the intelligence agencies. Two, establish a new domestic intelligence agency, similar to Britain's MI-5. This agency would have no law enforcement powers, and would work with the FBI when criminal investigations and arrests were necessary. The FBI would retain a small intelligence unit to serve as a liaison with the intelligence community. Domestic intelligence professionals can not flourish in a culture that rewards people for the number of cases solved, or the number of arrests made. Three, develop closer links with state and local law enforcement agencies. There are 700,000 state and law enforcement officers who can provide help by providing the intelligence community with raw intelligence, and by acting on threat assessments issued by the federal government. Four, create a new clandestine service. Human intelligence has become a lost art at the CIA. A new clandestine service should be established, and must be protected from second-guessing by the risk- averse politicized bureaucracy. Five, share more intelligence with other countries. American intelligence agencies have obtained much valuable intelligence from foreign intelligence services. But the American agencies have a reputation for not reciprocating. If we want to maintain the flow of information from these other services, we must be more generous with the information we provide them. Six, require all intelligence reports to be uploaded immediately to Intelink (ph), the intelligence community secret online database. This will help foster information exchange at all level of the intelligence community. Seven, reorient the National Security Agency to be a hunter of information rather than a gatherer. The volume of electronic communications has grown exponentially, to the point where intercepts cannot be translated in a timely manner. We've all read about the two intercepts on September 10th that warned of something to happen on September 11th that were translated on September 12th. The agency must learn to focus its resources on those communications links most likely to yield information about terrorist threats. Eight, upgrade technical intelligence. The proliferation of new communications technologies has hampered the NSA's ability to intercept messages. Some of the nation's best scientists and engineers should be assigned to a Manhattan Project-style program aimed at making breakthroughs in new technologies for monitoring electronic communications. Nine, set up a separate oversight subcommittee specifically for intelligence on terrorism. While this is by no means an exhaustive list, I believe it addresses some of the most urgent problems in the intelligence community. Whether you decide to accept or reject these specific recommendations, I hope you will agree that the monumental tragedy of 9/11 requires changes far more sweeping than the reform measures that have been implemented in recent years. Finally, I join Kristin in urging Congress to establish an independent commission to study the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. While the work of your inquiry is invaluable, it has become clear that you cannot complete a thorough, comprehensive investigation by the end of the 107th Congress. And also there are other 9/11 issues other than intelligence that should be investigated by an independent commission, such as law enforcement, border control and immigration policy, diplomacy, transportation security and the flow of assets to terrorists. PUSH: In conclusion, I would like to thank you again for offering the 9/11 families this opportunity to have our voices and the voices of our loved ones heard on these very important issues. (APPLAUSE) CHAIRMAN: Mr. Push, thank you very much for that very informative statement, and your specific recommendations. They will be taken fully into account throughout the completion of our inquiry. PUSH: Thank you, sir. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. The panel is dismissed. Again, we extend our thanks and appreciation to Ms. Breitweiser and to Mr. Push and to all the families who are with us today. You are a reminder of why we are undertaking this inquiry. You are a challenge for us to fully fulfill our obligation. Ms. Eleanor Hill, staff director of the Joint Inquiry Committee? HILL: Good morning, Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, members of these committees. Before I proceed with my statement, I have a long written statement which I would like to submit for the record, and I'm going to orally summarize it, given the length of what we have here. CHAIRMAN: The full statement will appear in the record. HILL: Thank you. But before I get into the main part of the statement, I do want to make clear to you and members of the committees that the information that's in this statement that we're going to present this morning has been cleared for public release. And, as I think most of you know, much of the information that our staff has been working on over the last several months is obviously highly classified, or has been highly classified. In the course of the last two months, we have been working with the intelligence community in a long and what I would call very arduous process to declassify much of the information that we have reviewed and that we believe is important to the public's understanding of why the intelligence community did not know of the September 11th attacks in advance. And I would point out that that process -- we want to say for the record that we appreciate the many long hours that have been put into that process and what I believe has been very constructive cooperation with the executive branch on that process. A good number of professionals from the community have been in working groups and have gone over with our staff the details of this information to put it in a form where it could be released publicly. So we have made very good progress. But I do need to report that by late last night, we were able to resolve all but two issues where we believe relevant information to the inquiry has not yet, despite our discussions with the executive branch, been declassified. And I want to make reference to those two issues because this statement has been prepared recognizing that those two areas remain classified. The two areas are any references to the intelligence committee providing information to the president or the White House, and the identity of, and information on, a key Al Qaida leader involved in the September 11th attacks. According to the White House and the DCI -- director of Central Intelligence -- the president's knowledge of intelligence information relevant to this inquiry remains classified, even when the substance of that intelligence information has been declassified. With respect to the key Al Qaida leader involved in the September 11th attacks, I am advised this morning that the White House and not the DCI has declined to declassify his identity despite an enormous volume of media reporting on this individual that has been out there for some time. The joint inquiry staff disagrees on both of those issues. We believe the public has an interest in this information and that public disclosure would not harm national security. However, as I believe you know, we do not have the independent authority to declassify intelligence information short of a lengthy procedure in the U.S. Congress, and we therefore have prepared this statement without detailed descriptions of our work in those two areas... ROEMER: Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roemer? ROEMER: Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roemer? ROEMER: Are the committees bound by the classification decisions made in these two instances? CHAIRMAN: It is our advice from staff director and counsel that we do not independently have the authority to declassify material, and therefore we are constrained by the decisions made by those who have that legal responsibility. ROEMER: Further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman: Is there a process then that either the committee or the Congress can undertake to challenge a classification decision such as that? CHAIRMAN: The answer is yes, and I would like -- Ms. Hill alluded to the fact that there was such a process. I think she described it as being cumbersome. If you or counsel might briefly explain what the option is to Congress. HILL: Mr. Chairman, I am not an expert on the committee process. As I understand it, from speaking with the full committee counsel on this, it would require the Congress to -- you'd have to have a vote -- I'm not sure if it's the full Congress or the Senate or House, but there's a vote involved. You would have to run it through -- the Congress itself would have to override that classification decision. The reason that we -- we did not originate this information, and under the classification system, the agency that originates it makes the classification and declassifies it, and in this case, that would not be the Congress. So the only alternative would be to go through this rather -- what I am told is a lengthy, rather prolonged process. I should point out that right before the hearing this morning I was advised by the White House that they were going to look at these two issues again and they thought they would review it again within the next 48 hours. And I advised them that if their position changes, please to advise the committees and we could always issue a supplemental statement on those two issues for the record. So my assumption is they are still reviewing it. ROEMER: Final parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman: Does the chairman intend to have this committee consider or debate that kind of process? I'm not advocating that we challenge it at this point, but certainly understanding more from the joint inquiry staff that strongly disagrees with the decision as to why might be helpful in a deliberative sense for the committee. CHAIRMAN: I think there are two questions in your inquiry. One is whether we might consider utilizing the currently existing process in this or future instances in which we have a disagreement as to whether the information which is being withheld is, in fact, classified information; i.e., that it relates to the national security. Second question might be, as part of our final report, we might want to recommend to our colleagues a change in the law that relates to the congressional role in declassification so that it would be more available as an alternative in the event that there was a disagreement between Congress and an executive classifying agency. ROEMER: Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope we do have a robust discussion of this, and I appreciate your patience. PELOSI: Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms. Pelosi? PELOSI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in your earlier comments commending Eleanor Hill and Rick Sacragroni (ph) and the joint inquiry staff for their fine work. And I want to inquire if it's possible, just on this point, that the parliamentary inquiry that Mr. Roemer brought up, if Ms. Hill could just clarify. It says, "Any reference to the intelligence community providing information to the president or the White House." Could you give us an example of that? HILL: What we're referring to is obvious, and it's clear as you go through this statement that I'm about to present, that we are talking about a number of intelligence reports, which we have had declassified through this process. And part of our role was not just looking at what was the reporting, but where the reporting went. And you will note that this statement includes many intelligence reports. And in some instances says they were provided to senior government officials, I believe is the wording that's used, but there's no reference on any of the pages as to whether the president received that information or not. And we have been told that that information -- in other words, not what is in the report, but rather or not it went to the president, would be classified under this decision. PELOSI: And when you say the president, you mean any president... HILL: That's correct. And clearly if you look at this statement the reporting has dates on it and the reporting is not just reporting that would have been under the current administration, but also reporting that was made under the prior administration. And the decision, in fairness, obviously to the White House, it is not simply as to this sitting president, but as to any president. PELOSI: Well, I would hope, Mr. Chairman, whoever's presiding here, that Mr. Roemer's comments will be taken seriously by the chairman and that the committee should consider the options under existing committee rules to make this information public, depending on how it goes in the next 48 hours. I think that the White House should be aware that there is strong interest among many of us to have this be the most open process possible in fairness to those families who are affected, we heard from this morning, and really in the interest of a democratic society. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LAHOOD: Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN: Chairman Graham had to step out for a moment. He'll be back. But I assure you, Ms. Pelosi, that he will be attentive to that request, as will I. Is it a point of inquiry or on this matter? LAHOOD: On this matter. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lahood? LAHOOD: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the two chairman could approach the White House within the next 48 hours since they have this under consideration to encourage them to make this information public and to relay the will of -- I believe it's the will of the joint committee that, based on what our staff director has said, that this information is important to be released. And it sounds like they're trying to make a political decision. And the joint committee would encourage them to release the information. I say that because it's under consideration. And I think it's important, particularly given the testimony that was provided by the first two witnesses. Thank you. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Lahood. I assure that this is not a matter of first impression for the two chairman or actually the four of us. We have made this case before. And just so all members of the committee and the public will know, there are approximately three generalized areas that we feel there is legitimacy to withhold information to the public. Otherwise we feel the burden is on to the administration to prove to us why we should not give it to the public. We take the position the public deserves it. Those three exceptions are, of course, sources of methods, particularly those are still active; plans and intentions that would be involving any actions we might take, which might put our personnel at harm by giving advance information about what they're up to; and the third area is in the active prosecutions ongoing by the Department of Justice. We don't want to any way mess up a prosecution that is going forward by saying something inadvertent that would create a problem for the prosecution. I think other than those three areas the public has a right to know and a need to know. Because part of the reason we're going public here is the awareness curve of what this enemy looks like, what they can do to us, and why we need to have a better system and why we are going to be asking for the support of our constituency, the American people, to give us a better intelligence system and all that that means. Well, I hope that's a satisfactory answer. And your request is duly noted and will be dealt with. Would you please proceed, after I advise the members that we have about 12 minutes left on a vote in the House? Is it one vote or two? Do we know? I believe it is one vote. The members of the Senate wish to continue. FEINSTEIN: Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN: Yes, Senator? FEINSTEIN: Might I ask a question? Will there be a brief recess over the lunch hour for those of us that have commitments? CHAIRMAN: It had been intended that there would not be. And I would suggest that when Senator Graham comes back that you confer with him on that. The members of the House are now going to vote. And we will be away for about 20 minutes. And perhaps in that time you can decide how you wish to carry forward. (UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, do you want us to wait and suspend the hearing, because you won't have the benefit of our testimony? CHAIRMAN: What is the view of the members? Do you want them to suspend or... (UNKNOWN): Until you get back. I think so. CHAIRMAN: OK. We'll take a suspension until you return. The hearing will suspend until the members of the House return. (RECESS) CHAIRMAN: Call the hearing back to order. CHAIRMAN: Ms. Eleanor Hill was in the early stages of providing us with the report of the joint inquiry staff. For purposes of people's schedules, it is our plan, after Ms. Hill completes her statement, to then call upon members in the order in which they arrived for five minutes of either questions or comments. I recognize that we'll be running through the lunch hour. If members have to leave for previous commitments or the pangs of hunger become overwhelming, they are encouraged to do so, but also encouraged to return so that they can have their opportunity to ask questions or make their comments. Ms. Hill? HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (UNKNOWN): Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, could you read the list so we might know where we are? CHAIRMAN: Yes, ma'am. After the chairs and vice chairs, they are in this order: Senator DeWine, Congressman Boehlert, Senator Wyden, Congressman Bereuter, Congressman Bishop, Senator Levin, Senator Inhofe, Congressman Peterson, Congressman Kramer, Congressman Boswell, Congressman Castle, Congressman Roemer, Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Burr, Senator Bayh, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Feinstein, Senator Mikulski, Congressman Lahood, Congressman Hoekstra, Senator Edwards, Congressman Gibbons, Congressman Everett. (UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN: Yes. (UNKNOWN): Would it be appropriate to ask unanimous consent of the members that if individuals do have to leave, if they have statements that they could be included as part of the record? CHAIRMAN: It will be included in the record. (UNKNOWN): I thank the chair. CHAIRMAN: Are there any other comments before we return to Ms. Hill? Ms. Hill? HILL: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Before I forget, I do want to ask that -- we have two versions of this statement. It's the same statement, but we have two copies, one of which has been signed and certified as releasable, cleared for public release by the chair of the declassification working group for the intelligence community, and each page has been initialed by that individual. And the second copy that I would also like to make available and part of the record is a similar copy that was signed and certified by the representative of the Department of Justice and initialed, indicating that they agreed and concurred that it was suitable for public release. Because, as you know, the Justice Department has some litigation concerns, ongoing cases. So I'd ask that those be made part of the record. CHAIRMAN: Without objection. HILL: I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to advise the committees and the American public on the progress to date of the joint inquiry staff's review of the activities of the U.S. intelligence community in connection with the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. As the horror and sheer inhumanity of that day engulfed this nation, all of us struggled with shock, with the utter disbelief, and the inevitable search for answers. The questions, if not the answers, were obvious: How could we have been so surprised? What did our government, especially our intelligence agencies, know before September 11th, 2001? Why didn't they know more? What can we do to strengthen and improve the capabilities of our intelligence agencies and as a result help save ourselves and our children from ever having to face this again? On February 14th, 2002, the leadership of these two committees announced their resolve to come together to find credible answers to those sobering but critically important questions. The committees joined in an unprecedented, bicameral and bipartisan joint inquiry effort to meet that challenge. To conduct the review, the committees assembled a single staff, that we call the joint inquiry staff, of 24 highly skilled professionals with experience in such areas as intelligence collection, analysis, management, law enforcement, investigations and oversight. My testimony this morning is intended to address the inquiry's initial task, which was to conduct a factual review of what the intelligence community knew or should have known prior to September 11th, 2001 regarding the international terrorist threat to the United States. I caution that the inquiry remains a work in progress, and that we may be developing additional relevant information as our work continues. That being said, we feel it is important to share with the American people, through these hearings, what we have found through our efforts to date. Let me briefly describe the way in which we have approached this review. We decided to target our search on categories of information that would most likely yield any intelligence material of relevance to the September 11th attacks. Specifically, our teams requested and reviewed from the intelligence community agencies these categories of information: any information attained before September 11th suggesting that an attack on the United States was imminent, and what was done with it; any information obtained before September 11th that should have alerted the intelligence community to this kind of attack, that is, using airplanes to attack buildings, and what was done with it; any information obtained before September 11th about the 19 dead hijackers and what was done with it; and any information obtained after September 11th about the hijackers and their backgrounds, including their involvement with Al Qaida, entry into this country and activities while in this country, as well as why they never came to the attention of the United States government. And I would point out on the issue of the hijackers that we do intend -- we will not address that this morning, but we do attend to have an additional statement at subsequent hearings that are focused on that issue. As part of this review of the evolution of the international terrorist threat against the United States, the joint inquiry staff produced a chronology that begins in 1982 and ends on September 11th, 2001. And that chronology I believe has been reproduced and handed out, and is also depicted on these charts here in the room this morning. And I would request that the chronology also be part of the record. CHAIRMAN: Without objection, so ordered. HILL: The chronology notes significant events in international terrorism, significant counter terrorism actions that were taken by the U.S. government in response to the threat, and information received by the intelligence community that was potentially relevant to the September 11th attacks. The chronology underscores several points regarding what the U.S. government, specifically the intelligence community, knew about the international terrorist threat to the United States and U.S. interests prior to September 11th, 2001. And these are those points. September 11th, while indelible in magnitude and in impact, was by no means America's first confrontation with international terrorism. While the nature of the threat has evolved and changed over time, it has long been recognized that United States interests were considered prime targets by various international terrorist groups. In response to a number of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests abroad during the 1980s, the U.S. government initiated a focused effort against terrorism, including the establishment by the director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, of the Counter-Terrorism Center, or CTC, at CIA headquarters in 1986. In 1996, 10 years later, the FBI created its own counter-terrorism center at FBI headquarters. Both in terms of attempts and actual attacks, there was considerable historical evidence prior to September 11th that international terrorists had planned and were in fact capable of conducting major terrorist strikes within the United States. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the subsequent discovery in 1993 of plots to bomb New York City landmarks, and the arrest in 1999 during the millennium of an individual with Al Qaida connections intending to bomb Los Angeles International Airport should have erased any doubt, to the extent they existed, about that point. From 1994 through as late as August 2001, the intelligence community had received information indicating that international terrorists had seriously considered the use of airplanes as a means of carrying out terrorist attacks. HILL: While this method of attack had clearly been discussed in terrorist circles, there was apparently little, if any, effort by intelligence community analysts to produce any strategic assessments of terrorists using aircraft as weapons. Osama bin Laden's role in international terrorism came to the attention of the intelligence community in the early 1990s. While bin Laden was initially viewed as a financier of terrorism, by 1996 the intelligence community was aware of his involvement in directing terrorist acts, and had begun actively collecting intelligence on him. Bin Laden's own words indicated a steadily escalating threat. In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a public fatwa, or religious decree, authorizing attacks on Western military targets in the Arabian peninsula. In February 1998, bin Laden issued another public fatwa authorizing and promoting attacks on U.S. civilians and military personnel anywhere in the world. Following the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, intelligence community leadership recognized how dangerous bin Laden's network was. In December 1998, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet provided written guidance to his deputies at the CIA declaring in effect a, quote, "war" with bin Laden. While counter-terrorism was a resource priority from the time of the DCI statement onward, it was competing with several other intelligence priorities, such as nonproliferation. Despite the DCI's declaration of war in 1998, there was no massive shift in budget or reassignment of personnel to counter-terrorism until after September 11th, 2001. By late 1998, the intelligence community had amassed a growing body of information, though general in nature, and lacking specific details on time and on place, indicating that bin Laden and the Al Qaida network intended to strike within the United States. And concern about bin Laden continued to grow over time and reached peak levels in the spring and summer of 2001, as the intelligence community faced increasing numbers of reports of imminent Al Qaida attacks against U.S. interests. In July and August 2001, that rise in intelligence reporting began to decrease, just as three additional developments occurred in the United States: the Phoenix memo, the detention of Zacarias Moussaoui, and the intelligence community's realization that two individuals with ties to bin Laden's network, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, were possibly in the United States. The two individuals turned out to be two of the 19 hijackers on September 11. The intelligence community apparently had not connected these individual warning flags to each other, to the drum beat of threat reporting that had just occurred, or to the urgency of the war effort against bin Laden. Our review today provides further context for each of these points. And my written statement addresses in great detail each point. For purposes of this review, I'm going to focus not on the historical section, but rather on our review of more recent intelligence reporting. And the first point in that regard would be intelligence reporting on bin Laden's intentions to strike inside the United States. Central to the September 11th plot was Osama bin Laden's idea of carrying out a terrorist operation within the United States. It has been suggested that prior to September 11th, 2001, information available to the intelligence community had, for the most part, pointed to a terrorist threat against U.S. interests abroad. Our review confirms that shortly after Osama bin Laden's May 1998 press conference, the intelligence community began to acquire intelligence information indicating that bin Laden's network intended to strike within the United States. These intelligence reports, which I'll go through in a minute, should be understood in their proper context. First, they generally did not contain specific information as to where, when and how a terrorist attack might occur, and generally they are not collaborated by further information. Second, these reports represented a small percentage of the threat information that the intelligence community obtained during this period. Most of which pointed to the possibility of attacks against U.S. interests overseas. Nonetheless, there was a modest but relatively steady stream of intelligence information indicating the possibility of terrorist attack within the United States. Third, the credibility of the sources providing this information was sometimes questionable. While one could not, as a result, give too much credence to some individual reports, the totality of information in the body of reporting clearly reiterated a consistent and critically important theme: bin Laden's intent to launch terrorist attacks inside the United States. HILL: And I will summarize several of these reports. And I should stress again, these are in declassified versions. They have been declassified. In June 1998, the intelligence community obtained information from several sources that bin Laden was considering attacks in the United States, including Washington, D.C., and New York. This information was provided to senior U.S. government officials in July 1998. In August 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the FAA. The FAA found the plot highly unlikely, given the state of that foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, they believed that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its intended target inside the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information, filing the communication in the office's bombing repository file. The intelligence community has acquired additional information since then indicating there may be links between this group and other terrorists groups, including Al Qaida. In September 1998, the intelligence community prepared a memorandum detailing Al Qaida infrastructure in the United States, including the use of fronts for terrorist activity. This information was provided to senior U.S. government officials in September 1998. In September 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden's next operation would possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it. This information was provided to senior U.S. government officials in late 1998. In October 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that Al Qaida was trying to establish an operative cell within the United States. This information indicated there might be an effort under way to recruit U.S.-citizen Islamists and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle East and North Africa. In the fall of 1998, the intelligence community received information concerning a bin Laden plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington, D.C., areas. In November of 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that a bin Laden terrorist cell was attempting to recruit a group of five to seven young men from the United States to travel to the Middle East for training. This was in conjunction with planning to strike U.S. domestic targets. In November of 1998, the intelligence community received information that bin Laden and senior associates had agreed to allocate reward money for the assassinations of four top intelligence agency officers. The bounty for each assassination was $9 million. The bounty was in response to the U.S. announcement of an increase in the reward money for information leading to the arrest of bin Laden. In the spring of 1999, the intelligence community obtained information about a planned bin Laden attack on a U.S. government facility in Washington, D.C. In August 1999, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden's organization had decided to target the secretary of state, the secretary of defense and the director of central intelligence. "Target" was interpreted by intelligence community analysts to mean assassinate. In September 1999, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden and others were planning a terrorist act in the United States, possibly against specific landmarks in California and New York City. HILL: The reliability of the source of this information was unknown. In late 1999, the intelligence community obtained information regarding the bin Laden network's possible plans to attack targets in Washington, D.C., and New York City during the New Year's millennium celebrations. On December 14th, 1999, an individual named Ahmed Rassam was arrested as he attempted to enter the United States from Canada. An alert U.S. Customs Service officer in Port Washington stopped Rassam and asked to search his vehicle. Chemicals and detonator materials were found in his car. Rassam's intended target was Los Angeles International Airport. In February 2000, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden was making plans to assassinate U.S. intelligence officials, including the director of the FBI. In March 2000, the intelligence community obtained information regarding the types of targets that operatives in bin Laden's network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, airports and nuclear power plants. In March 2000, the intelligence community obtained information indicating bin Laden was planning attacks in specific West Coast areas, possibly involving the assassination of several public officials. The intelligence community had concerns that this information might have come from a source known to fabricate information. And in April 2001, the intelligence community obtained information from a source with terrorist connections who speculated that bin Laden would be interested in commercial pilots as potential terrorists. The source warned that the United States should not focus only on embassy bombings, that terrorists sought, quote, "spectacular and traumatic," close quote, attacks and that the first World Trade Center bombing would be the type of attack that would be appealing. The source did not mention a time frame for any attack. Because the source was offering personal speculation and not hard information, the information was not disseminated within the intelligence community. Bin Laden's declaration of war in 1998 and intelligence reports indicating possible terrorist plots inside the United States did not go unnoticed by the intelligence community which, in turn, advised senior officials in the U.S. government of the serious nature of the threat. The staff has also reviewed documents other than individual intelligence reports that demonstrate that, at least at senior levels, the intelligence community understood that bin Laden posed a serious threat to the domestic United States. Here are five examples. A December 1st, 1998, intelligence community assessment of Osama bin Laden read, in part, and I quote, "UBL is actively planning against U.S. targets. Multiple reports indicate UBL is keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its own soil. Al Qaida is recruiting operatives for attacks in the U.S. but has not yet identified potential targets." On December 4th, 1998, in a memorandum to his deputies at the CIA, the director of Central Intelligence summed up the situation in this way: quote, "We must now enter a new phase in our effort against bin Laden. Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic. Yet each day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced. We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the community." A classified document signed by a senior U.S. government official in December 1998, read, in part, quote, "The intelligence community has strong indications that bin Laden intends to conduct or sponsor attacks inside the United States." In June 1999 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in a July 1999 briefing to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staffers, the chief of the CTC described reports that bin Laden and his associates were planning attacks in the United States. And a classified document signed by a senior U.S. government official in July 1999, characterized bin Laden's February 1998 statement as, quote, "a de facto declaration of war," close quote, on the United States. What is less clear is the extent to which other parts of the government, as well as the American people, understood and fully appreciated the gravity and the immediacy of the threat. HILL: For example, officials at the National Security Agency whom we have interviewed were aware of DCI Tenet's December 1998 declaration that the intelligence community was at war with bin Laden. On the other hand, relatively few of the FBI agents interviewed by the joint inquiry staff seem to have been aware of DCI Tenet's declaration. There was also considerable variation in the degree to which FBI- led joint terrorism task forces, or JTTFs, prioritized and coordinated field efforts targeting bin Laden and Al Qaida. While the FBI's New York office was the lead office in the vast majority of counter- terrorism investigations concerning bin Laden, many other FBI offices around the country were unaware of the magnitude of the threat. There are also indications that the allocation of intelligence community resources after the DCI's December 1998 declaration did not adequately reflect a true war effort against bin Laden. In 1999, the CTC had only three analysts assigned full time to bin Laden's terrorist network worldwide. After 2000, but before September 11th, 2001, that number had risen to five. On a broader scale, our review has found little evidence prior to September 11th of a sustained national effort to mobilize public awareness and to harden the homeland against the potential assault by bin Laden within the United States, with the possible exception of a heightened focus on weapons of mass destruction. The second point that I want to cover is strategic warning: indications of a possible terrorist attack in the spring and summer of 2001. Let me briefly describe what we have found regarding the level and the nature of threat information that was obtained by the intelligence community during the spring and summer of 2001. During that time period, the community experienced a significant rise in information indicating that bin Laden and Al Qaida intended to strike against United States interests in the very near future. Some individuals within the community have suggested that the increase in threat reporting was unprecedented, at least in terms of their own experience. While the reporting repeatedly predicted dire consequences for Americans, it did not provide actionable detail on when, where and how specific attacks would occur. Between late March and September 2001, the intelligence community detected numerous indicators of an impending terrorist attack, some of which pointed specifically to the United States as a possible target. In March 2001, an intelligence source claimed a group of bin Laden operatives were planning to conduct an unspecified attack in the United States in April 2001. One of the operatives allegedly resided within the United States. In April 2001, the intelligence community obtained information that unspecified terrorist operatives in California and New York state were planning a terrorist attack in those states for April. Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported at least 33 communications indicating a possible imminent terrorist attack. None of these reports provided any specific information on where, when or how an attack might occur, nor was it clear that any of the individuals involved in these intercepted communications had any firsthand knowledge of where, when or how an attack might occur. If they did know, it was not evident in the intercepts. These reports were widely disseminated within the intelligence community. In May 2001, the intelligence community obtained information that supporters of bin Laden were reportedly planning to infiltrate the United States via Canada in order to carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. The report mentioned an attack within the United States, though it did not say where in the U.S., or when or how an attack might occur. In July 2001, this information was shared with the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service and the State Department, and was included in a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials in August 2001. In May 2001, the Department of Defense acquired and shared with other elements of the intelligence community information indicating that seven individuals associated with bin Laden had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. In June 2001, the DCI's CTC had information that key operatives in Osama bin Laden's organization were disappearing, while others were preparing for martyrdom. In July 2001, the DCI's CTC was aware of an individual who had recently been in Afghanistan who had reported, quote, "everyone is talking about an impending attack," close quote. The intelligence community was also aware that bin Laden had stepped up his propaganda efforts in the preceding months. On August 16th, 2001, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the INS detained Zacharias Moussaoui. Prior to that date, in August 2001, Mr. Moussaoui's conduct had aroused suspicions about why he was learning to fly large commercial aircraft, and had prompted the flight school he was attending in Minneapolis to contact the local FBI office. FBI agents believed that Moussaoui may have been intending to carry out a terrorist act. HILL: On August 23rd, 2001, the intelligence community requested that two individuals, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who had first come to the attention of the community in 1999 as possible associates of bin Laden's terrorist network, be added to the U.S. Department of State's watch list for denying visas to individuals attempting to enter the United States. Working levels of INS and U.S. Customs had determined that at least one of them was likely in the United States, prompting FBI headquarters to request searches for them in both New York and Los Angeles. The FBI's New York field office unsuccessfully searched for Almihdhar and Alhazmi. The FBI's Los Angeles office received the search request on September 11th, 2001. In late summer 2001, the intelligence community obtained information that an individual associated with Al Qaida was considering mounting terrorist operations within the United States. There was no information available as to the timing of possible attacks or the alleged targets. And on September 10th, 2001, NSA intercepted two communications between individuals abroad suggesting imminent terrorist activity. These communications were not translated into English and disseminated until September 12th, 2001. These intercepts did not provide any indication of where or what activity might occur. Despite these indicators of a possible terrorist attack inside the United States, during the course of interviews the joint inquiry staff was told that it was the general view of the U.S. intelligence community in the spring and summer of 2001 that an attack on U.S. interests was more likely to occur overseas. Individuals in the intelligence community pointed to intelligence information, the arrests of suspected terrorists in the Middle East and Europe and a credible report of a plan to attack a U.S. embassy in the Middle East as factors that shaped their thinking about where an attack was likely to occur. One senior FBI officials said that based on the intelligence he was seeing, he thought there was a high probability, quote, "98 percent," close quote, that the attack would occur overseas. During the summer of 2001 the intelligence community was also disseminating information through appropriate channels to senior U.S. government officials about possible terrorist attacks. For example, in June 2001, the community issued a terrorist threat advisory warning U.S. government agencies that there was a high probability of an imminent terrorist attack against U.S. interests by Sunni extremists associated with bin Laden's Al Qaida organization. The advisory mentioned the Arabian peninsula, Israel and Italy as possible locations. According to the advisory, the community continued to believe that Sunni extremists associated with Al Qaida are most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Subsequently, intelligence information provided to senior U.S. government leaders indicated that bin Laden's organization expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties. A briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July 2001 contained the following language, quote, "Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." Later intelligence information provided to senior government leaders indicated that bin Laden's organization continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interests. The joint inquiry staff has been advised by a representative of the intelligence community that about a month later, in August 2001, a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials included information that bin Laden had wanted to conduct attacks in the United States since 1997. The information included discussion of the arrests of Ahmed Ressam in December 1999 and the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It mentioned that members of Al Qaida, including some U.S. citizens, had resided or traveled in or traveled to the United States for years and that the group apparently maintained a support structure here. The report cited uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the release of U.S.-held extremists. FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attack and the number of bin Laden-related investigations under way, as well as information acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of bin Laden supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives. In August 2001, based on information it had in its possession at the time, the CIA sent a message to the FAA asking the FAA to advise corporate security directors of U.S. air carriers of the following information: quote, "A group of six Pakistanis currently based in Bolivia may be planning to conduct a hijacking or possibly a bombing or an act of sabotage against a commercial airliner. While we have no details of the carrier, the date or the location of this or these possibly planned actions, we have learned that the group has had discussions in which Canada, England, Malaysia, Cuba, South Africa, Mexico, Atlanta, New York, Madrid, Moscow and Dubai, have come up, and India and Islamabad have been described as possible travel destinations," close quote. While this information was not related to an attack planned by Al Qaida, it did alert the aviation community to the possibly that a hijacking plot might occur in the U.S. shortly before the September 11th attacks occurred. Now, I want to turn to intelligence information on possible terrorist use of airplanes as weapons. Central to the September 11th attack was the terrorist use of airplanes as weapons. In the aftermath of the attacks, there was much discussion about the extent to which our government was or could have been aware of the threat of terrorist attacks of this type and the extent to which adequate precautions were taken to address the threat. Based on our review to date, we believe that the intelligence community was aware of the potential for this type of terrorist attack, but did not produce any specific assessment of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons. Our review has uncovered several examples of intelligence reporting on the possible use of airplanes as weapons in terrorist operations. In December 1994, Algerian-armed Islamic Group terrorists hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. HILL: French authorities deceived the terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Paris and diverted it. A French anti-terrorist force stormed the plane and killed all four terrorists. In January 1995, a Philippine national police raid turned up materials in a Manila apartment indicating that three individuals planned, among other things, to crash a plane into CIA headquarters. The Philippine national police said that the same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine airliner on December 12, 1994. Information on the threat was passed to the FAA, which briefed U.S. and major foreign carriers. In January 1996, the intelligence community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by individuals associated with Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and a key Al Qaida operative. The plan was to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and attack the White House. In October 1996, the intelligence community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crashed it into Tel Aviv. An individual would board the plane in the Far East. During the flight, he would commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv and then crash the plane into the city. In 1997, one of the units at FBI headquarters became concerned about the possibility of a terrorist group using an unmanned aerial vehicle, UAV, for terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reporting that this group had purchased a UAV. At the time, the agencies' view was that the only reason that this group would need a UAV would be for either reconnaissance or attack. There was more concern about the possibility of an attack outside the United States; for example, by flying the UAV into a U.S. embassy or a visiting U.S. delegation. As noted previously, in August '98, the intelligence community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. Also noted previously, in September '98, the intelligence community obtained information that bin Laden's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it. In November 1998, the community obtained information that a Turkish Islamic extremist group had planned a suicide attack to coincide with celebrations making the death of Ataturk. The conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an airplane packed with explosives into Ataturk's tomb during a government ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with Osama bin Laden. The FBI's New York office included this incident in one of its Osama bin Laden databases. In February 1999, the intelligence community obtained information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The CIA commented that this was highly unlikely and probably disinformation. In March 1999, the intelligence community obtained information regarding a plan by an Al Qaida member, who was a U.S. citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian presidential palace and then detonate the explosives he was carrying. The individual, who received hang glider training in the United States, brought the hang glider back to Afghanistan. In April 2000, the intelligence community obtained |