This report summarizes what the Oversight Committee has learned about (1) the misleading information given to the Tillman family and the public following the death of Corporal Patrick Tillman on April 22, 2004, and (2) the misleading information released about the capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch in Iraq in March and April, 2003.

Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch are the two most famous soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The misinformation in both their cases is an unconscionable distraction from their actual service and heroism. Their dedication to country and willingness to voluntarily put themselves at great risk are extraordinary examples of patriotism and bravery.

The military has conducted seven separate investigations into Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire in the mountains of Afghanistan. Two early Army investigations focused on reconstructing the events that resulted in the shooting. The scope of later investigations was broadened to include evaluations of whether military officials complied with the Army’s casualty notification regulations, whether military personnel involved in Corporal Tillman’s death committed criminal acts, and whether the previous investigations had been properly conducted.

These investigations have looked down the chain of command, resulting in punishment or reprimands for enlisted personnel and officers who acted improperly before and after Corporal Tillman’s death. To date, the highest ranking officer to receive a punishment related to Corporal Tillman’s death is a three-star general.

In contrast, the Committee’s investigation into Corporal Tillman’s fratricide has looked up the chain of command. The purpose of the investigation has been to determine what the top officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide, when they knew this, and what they did with their knowledge.

The Committee’s investigation adds many new details to the Tillman story. But on the key issue of what senior officials knew, the investigation was frustrated by a near universal lack of recall. The Committee interviewed several senior officials at the White House, including Communications Director Dan Bartlett, Press Secretary Scott McClellan, and chief speechwriter Michael Gerson. Not a single one could recall when he learned about the fratricide or what he did in response.

Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Committee: “I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told me.”

The highest-ranking official who could recall being informed about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide was former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, who said, “I knew right at the end of April, that there was a possibility of fratricide in the Corporal Tillman death.” General Myers testified that it would have been “logical” for him to pass this information to Secretary Rumsfeld, but said “I just don't recall whether I did it or not.” He also said he could not recall “ever having a discussion with anybody in the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.”

The Committee’s investigation into the inaccurate accounts of Private Lynch’s capture and rescue also encountered a consistent lack of recollection. Witnesses who should have possessed relevant information were interviewed by the Committee. They said they had no knowledge of how the report that Private Lynch fired her weapon and was wounded during her capture was spread to the media and the public. Nor could they explain why it took so long for the military to correct the inaccurate story of the “little girl Rambo from the hills of West Virginia” that was widely reported during the opening days of the Iraq war.

The White House Response to Corporal Tillman’s Death

The death of Corporal Tillman on April 22, 2004, generated a flurry of attention and action inside the White House. On the day following his death, April 23, White House officials sent or received nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman. Several e-mails came from staff members on President Bush’s reelection campaign, who urged the President to respond publicly to Corporal Tillman’s death. The White House did respond, rushing out a statement notwithstanding a Department of Defense policy intended to provide 24-hour period for private grieving before officials publicly discuss a casualty.

In comparison to the extensive White House activity that followed Corporal Tillman’s death, the complete absence of any communications about his fratricide is hard to understand. The Committee requested all White House documents related to Corporal Tillman. The White House provided what it described as a complete response, giving the Committee access to approximately 1,500 pages of e-mails and other documents and withholding only drafts of a speech in which the President discussed Corporal Tillman. Yet there is not a single discussion of the fratricide in any of these communications.

On April 29, 2004, Major General Stanley McChrystal sent a “personal for” or “P4” memorandum up his chain of command. This memo warned that the President might be preparing a speech about Corporal Tillman without knowing that he was killed by friendly fire, and it urged the generals receiving the memo to prevent any “unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death become public.” When the President spoke about Corporal Tillman’s death in a speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner two days later, the President commented on Corporal Tillman’s character and his sacrifice in enlisting, but did not address the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death.

The Committee interviewed seven officials in the White House about the response to Corporal Tillman’s death. Universally, these officials said they could not recall when they learned about the fratricide or when the President learned. Former presidential speechwriter Michael Gerson, who worked on the President’s May 1 speech at the Correspondents’ Dinner, said that he could not remember when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he knew about it while preparing the Correspondents’ Dinner speech, or whether he ever discussed the fratricide with the President.

Former Communications Director Dan Bartlett said he did not have a “specific recollection” of when he learned of the friendly fire. Asked whether he informed the President of the fratricide, he stated, “I don’t remember a particular conversation, but I can’t rule out that I talked to him about it.” Former Press Secretary Scott McClellan said he also could not remember when he or the President learned about the fratricide.

Secretary Rumsfeld’s Response to Corporal Tillman’s Death

Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s enlistment in the U.S. Army Rangers in 2002. Just after Corporal Tillman enlisted, Secretary Rumsfeld sent him a personal note commending him for his “proud and patriotic” decision. Around the same time, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a “snowflake” memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, noting that Corporal Tillman “sound[s] like he is world-class” and saying, “We might want to keep our eye on him.”

Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said had no recollection of when he learned about the fratricide or what he did in response. He testified, “I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told me. But my recollection is that it was at a stage when there were investigations under way.”

General Myers’s Response to Corporal Tillman’s Death

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, learned of Corporal Tillman’s death soon after it occurred. One day after Corporal Tillman’s death, General Myers called the commissioner of the National Football League to inform him of the incident.

General Myers also learned quickly about the possible fratricide. He told the Committee that he knew by the end of April, but could not recall whether he informed Secretary Rumsfeld or President Bush. General Myers did recall discussing the fratricide with his public affairs advisor, telling him, “We need to keep this in mind in case we go before the press. We’ve just got to calibrate ourselves. With this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful how we portray the situation.” General Myers told the Committee that he had no responsibility to share the information about the possible fratricide with the Tillman family or the public.

General Abizaid’s Response to Corporal Tillman’s Death

General John Abizaid, commanding general at CENTCOM and the main addressee on General McChrystal’s P4 message, testified that due to a delay at his headquarters, he did not receive the P4 message until approximately May 6, 2004, a week after it was sent. When he finally received the message, he immediately called the Joint Chiefs chairman, General Myers, and discovered that General Myers was already aware of the potential fratricide.

General Abizaid also testified that after returning from theater to Washington, DC, he informed Secretary Rumsfeld sometime between May 18 and May 20, 2004, that “there was an investigation that was ongoing, and it looked like it was friendly fire.”

The Response of Other Senior Military Leaders to Corporal Tillman’s Death

The Committee investigated the response of other top military leaders in Corporal Tillman’s chain of command, including General Bryan Brown of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). General Brown testified to the Committee that he received General McChrystal’s P4 message in late April, but made no effort to notify his superiors or the Tillman family about the potential fratricide. He said he made the “bad assumption” that these tasks would be handled by the “normal chain of command.”

General Kensinger declined to testify before the Committee in August 2007, but later agreed to be interviewed by Committee staff. He acknowledged that he did not inform the Tillman family as soon as he found out about the potential fratricide, but claimed that he only learned about the fratricide after attending the May 3, 2004, memorial for Corporal Tillman. This version of events was contradicted by General Kensinger’s deputy, Brigadier General Howard Yellen, who told Committee staff that he spoke with General Kensinger about the fratricide within two or three days after it occurred. It was also contradicted by Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy, who testified that he personally delivered the P4 message to General Kensinger three days before the memorial service, and by Colonel Clarence Chinn, deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, who testified that General Kensinger informed him that Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible fratricide.

The Response to the Capture and Rescue of Private Jessica Lynch

In the opening days of the Iraq war, a false account of the capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch became a front-page story across the country. Defense Department officials have openly acknowledged that the account of Private Jessica Lynch’s capture and rescue in the opening days of the Iraq war was an “awesome story,” but they could not explain to the Committee how and why the embellished account became so widely disseminated. Key public affairs officials told the Committee they could not recall any details of the Jessica Lynch incident.

I. INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

A. Investigations by the Department of Defense

There have been seven investigations conducted by the Department of Defense into the death of Corporal Tillman in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004, and the Department’s response. Each investigation has had serious flaws or limitations on its scope.

In the days following Corporal Tillman’s death, the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation (commonly referred to as a “15-6” investigation) into the circumstances surrounding the casualty. 1 This investigation reportedly concluded that Corporal Tillman’s death was a likely fratricide. 2 In a subsequent review of this investigation, the Defense Department Inspector General concluded that it was “tainted by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the failure to pursue investigative leads.” 3

In early May, the commander of the 75th Regiment decided not to approve the battalion-level investigation because “he did not find the work thorough or complete and concluded further investigation by someone more senior from the regimental level was required.” 4 He instead authorized a new regimental-level 15-6 investigation, which was approved by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on May 28, 2004. 5 This investigation concluded that “CPL Tillman’s death was the result of fratricide during an extremely chaotic enemy ambush.” 6 The Inspector General found this second 15-6 investigation also “lacked credibility,” in part because the investigator “failed to visit the scene,” “failed to identify and interview relevant witnesses,” and drew conclusions that “were not based on evidence included in the report.” 7

In August 2004, after an inquiry from the Tillman family, Army officials discovered that another investigation required by Army regulations, a “safety investigation,” had not been initiated. 8 Three months later, in October 2004, the friendly fire incident was belatedly reported to the Army’s Safety Center, which produced a report in December of that year. 9 The safety report concluded that a “high volume of fire” from several Rangers “struck one of the Rangers in the fighting position, fatally wounding him.” 10

1 Captain Richard M. Scott, Commander, Headquarters & Headquarter Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, AR 15-6 Final Report [Incomplete Draft] (Apr. 29, 2004).

2 Id. Although a complete draft of Captain Scott’s report has not been located, the Department of Defense Inspector General collected available drafts and exhibits and identified Captain Scott’s major findings. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 7 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

3 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

4 Id. at 20.

5 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004) (containing May 8, 2004, AR 15-6 report by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Kauzlarich, Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment).

6 Id. at 1.

7 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2, 31-32 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

8 Id. Army rules require both a 15-6 “legal” investigation and a prompt safety investigation in cases of fratricide. Army Regulation 385-40 (1994); DOD Instruction 6055.7 (2000).

9 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

10 U.S. Army Safety Center, U.S. Army Accident Report, Date of Accident 040422 (undated).

11 Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation — CPL Patrick Tillman (Jan. 7, 2005).

12 Id.

13 Id. at 10.

14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 3 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

15 Id.

16 Id. at 2.

17 Id. at 54.

18 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 99 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

19 Id.

20 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 54 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

21 U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Report of Investigation into Death of Corporal Tillman and AMF Soldier Thani, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2007).

22 Executive Summary, Army Action — Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).

23 Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 31, 2007); Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 31, 2007).

24 Id.; see also Executive Summary, Army Action — Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).

25 Id.

26 Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Richard Cody (July 31, 2007).

27 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 217 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

28 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

29 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 17 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

30 Id.

31 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49) (Serial No. 110-49).

32 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (April 27, 2007).

33 Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Aug. 10, 2007).

34 No contemporaneous transcript was produced from the interview with Mr. McCormack, but an unofficial transcript was created from an audio recording of the interview.

35 Ex-Player Tillman Likely in Danger Zone as an Army Ranger, Washington Times (Mar. 21, 2003).

36 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

37 Id.

38 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 18 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

39 Id. at 30.

40 Former NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan, Associated Press (Apr. 23, 2004); U.S. Military Says NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan Exemplified All Soldiers’ Patriotism, Associated Press (Apr. 24, 2004).

41 E-mail from David Compton, Office of the Army Chief Public Affairs, to numerous addressees (Apr. 25, 2004).

42 Id.

43 E-mail from Lieutenant Commander Jane Campbell, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Major Kristen Carle, Office of the Army Chief for Public Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004). (Reporting that Corporal Tillman’s death “was a topic of the discussion at the front office this morning and CJCS PA [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs] is also involved.”).

44 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Jeanie Mamo, Director of White House Media Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004).

45 Id.

46 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 23, 2004).

47 Id.

48 Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, “EXSUM” Document (Apr. 23, 2004).

49 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of U.S. Army Specialist Bryan O’Neal, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 94 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 13 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).

50 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

51 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, at 3 (Nov. 26, 2006).

52 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at 5 (Nov. 17, 2006).

53 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).

54 “Personal For” message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

55 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (Nov. 26, 2006).

56 “Personal For” message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

57 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

58 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

59 “Personal For” message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

60 E-mail from Carol Darby, Media and Community Relations Division Chief, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Bush, Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Apr. 28, 2004).

61 Id.

62 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 60 (July 27, 2007).

63 Id. at 61.

64 Army Regulation 600-8-22 § 3-10(b) (2006).

65 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 53 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

66 Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United States Army (undated).

67 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 55 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

68 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star to Fallen Ranger (Apr. 30, 2004).

69 Id.

70 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 69 (July 25, 2007).

71 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 54 (Feb. 29, 2008).

72 Id.

73 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 110 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

74 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Senior Chief Petty Officer Stephen White, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 111 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

75 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).

76 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

77 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

78 Id.

79 See, e.g., E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 29, 2004) (“No one will ever tell you, but nice job on this one. May have minimized … damage by pushing the panic button early.”).

80 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 29 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

81 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation, at 11 (May 28, 2004).

82 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 50 (July 24, 2007).

83 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 46 (July 24, 2007).

84 Id.

85 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel James Craig Nixon, at 121 (Oct. 28, 2006).

86 Id.

87 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 44 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).

88 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush (Sept. 19, 2007).

89 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson (July 27, 2007).

90 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita, at 69 (Sept. 24, 2007).

91 Id. at 63.

92 Id.

93 General Bryan Brown, Response to Questions from BG Jones (Dec. 9, 2004) (“[W]e initially told Mr. DiRita that OSD PA should make the announcement. They determined it should be a uniformed member of the chain of command. The logical choice was LTG Kensinger. I agreed.”).

94 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita, at 67 (Sept. 24, 2007).

95 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 40 (July 27, 2007).

96 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

97 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 63 (Feb. 29, 2008).

98 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

99 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 64 (Feb. 29, 2008).

100 E-mail from Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs (May 28, 2004).

101 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).

102 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).

103 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004).

104 E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 29, 2004).

105 E-mail from Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).

106 E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).

107 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

108 Id.

109 E-mail from Barry Jackson, Deputy to the President’s Senior Advisor, to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).

110 E-mail from Matthew Scully, Deputy Director of Presidential Speechwriting, to Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 23, 2004).

111 E-mail from Jennie M. Koch, Executive Assistant to the National Security Advisor, to Gregory Schulte, Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004).

112 E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

113 E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Chief Media Advisor, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

114 E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter Wehner, White House Director of Strategic Initiatives (Apr. 23, 2004).

115 E-mail from Ron Fournier to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).

116 Although various e-mails reviewed by the Committee referred to this as a “statement” or a “comment,” Mr. Gross explained that he had technically written a “response to an inquiry,” rather than a “presidential statement” because it was released only in reply to particular queries. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 61 (Sept. 5, 2007). Other White House officials also told the Committee that they saw a distinction between Mr. Gross’s “response to questions” and a more formal, proactive “presidential statement.” White House officials were unhappy with news coverage of Mr. Gross’s April 23 comment, possibly because the press referred to it is as a “statement” from the White House. See E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

117 E-mail from Taylor Gross, White House spokesman, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

118 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

119 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Taylor Gross, White House spokesman (Apr. 23, 2004).

120 Id.

121 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign (Apr. 23, 2004).

122 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

123 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 67 (Sept. 5, 2007).

124 Id. at 42.

125 Id. at 52.

126 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

127 Id.

128 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

129 Id.

130 Id.

131 Department of Defense, Instruction Number 1300.18 (2008).

132 Pub. L. 108-136.

133 U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1588 (Report 108-354), at 695 (Nov. 7, 2003). Representative Walter B. Jones, the original sponsor of act, explained that some military families “had little time to grieve” because they were forced to “fend off aggressive press inquiries” in the hours after a loved one’s death. A 24-hour delay on publicity, he said, “would not unreasonably impair the public’s access to information about military activities, but could provide an immeasurable amount of relief to those who have endured the loss.” Statement of Representative Walter B. Jones, Congressional Record, E889 (May 7, 2003).

134 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

135 Id.

136 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack, NSC Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). Mr. McCormack told the Committee he had no recollection of the events described in this e-mail.

137 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).

138 E-mail from Noam Neusner, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Speech Writing, to Erin Healy, Assistant White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

139 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett by Staff (Sept. 12, 2007).

140 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, White House Research Assistant, to Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 27, 2004).

141 President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House Correspondents’ Dinner (May 1, 2004).

142 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).

143 E-mail from Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting, to John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking (Apr. 28, 2004).

144 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Carol Darby, at 39 (Sept. 18, 2007).

145 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting (Apr. 28, 2004).

146 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).

147 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 29, 2004).

148 “Personal For” message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).

149 Although the acting Defense Department Inspector General, Thomas Gimble, testified that his office “think[s] the P4 memo stopped with the three generals that were on it,” the IG did not interview Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or any White House officials during its investigation. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).

150 10 U.S.C. 151(b).

151 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).

152 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).

153 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).

154 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Michael Gerson (Sept. 11, 2007).

155 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 102 (Sept. 5, 2007).

156 White House, President Bush Discusses American Competitiveness Initiative During Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2007).

157 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfe