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Some
Highlights from "Strategic Master Plan FY04 and Beyond"
Military
forces have always viewed the “high ground” position as one
of dominance
and warfare advantage. With rare exception, whoever owned the high ground
owned
the fight.
This
capability (Space) is the ultimate high ground of US military operations.
Today, control of this high ground means superiority in information and
significant
force enhancement. Tomorrow, ownership may mean instant engagement anywhere
in the world.
Planners
should consider integrating future development capabilities, such as the
capability to deliver attacks from space, into the campaign plan when
determining
how best to strike adversary Centers of Gravity (COG). Space force application
systems would have the advantages of rapid global access and the ability
to
effectively bypass adversary defenses.
...
Space
warfighting forces are our people, weapon systems and other capabilities
that operate
and employ space power in, from and through space. When fully and seamlessly
integrated with
other warfighting forces, space forces extend the reach, precision and
intensity of U.S. military
power and operations. Continuous deterrence and prompt global engagement
ensures the
ability to apply space forces when and where we need them and that our
adversary understands
the advantage we possess from these forces. We will also provide space
support to US
warfighters as well as our Allies and ensure our space systems are integrated
and usable by
coalition forces. Control and exploitation of space implies that we can
use our space capabilities
at our discretion while at the same time denying our adversaries access
to space assets at their
disposal.
...
Our
ability to provide these supporting space capabilities to the warfighter
is dependent on our
ability to control space. To date, our access to space has been unchallenged,
and we enjoy
control of space by default. Additionally, our ICBMs and other elements
of the strategic Triad will
continue to provide the deterrent underpinnings so important to our Nation’s
National Security
Strategy.
...
A
viable prompt global strike capability, whether nuclear or non-nuclear,
will allow the US to
rapidly strike high-payoff, difficult-to-defeat targets from stand-off
ranges and produce the
desired effect. This capability provides the US with the flexibility to
employ innovative strategies
to counter adversary anti-access and area denial strategies. Such a capability
will provide
warfighting commanders the ability to rapidly deny, delay, deceive, disrupt,
destroy, exploit and
neutralize targets in hours/minutes rather than weeks/days even when US
and allied forces
have a limited forward presence. Thus, prompt global strike space capabilities
will provide the
President and warfighting commanders with flexible options to deter or
defeat most threats in a
dynamic security environment.
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AFSPC’s
Counterspace capabilities are limited. AFSPC employs the Space Surveillance
Network (SSN) consisting of a combination of ground-based radars, telemetry
monitoring
stations, and optical sensors to perform the space surveillance portion
of Space Situation
Awareness. Our SSN systems detect, identify, characterize, track, and
catalog high interest
space objects; however, they cannot consistently detect small debris;
have limited capability to
detect, track, and characterize objects in high-altitude orbits; do not
meet all our timeliness
requirements; and have gaps in coverage.
Though
protective (survivability) countermeasures have been added on a case-by-case
basis to
US and allied satellite systems for protection against jamming, signal
interception, and nuclear
detonation, AFSPC currently has no active DCS systems. Likewise, AFSPC
has limited abilities
to detect, characterize, locate, and assess attacks or intrusions into
friendly space operations,
or to negate counterspace systems; limited ability to prevent an adversary
from exploiting some
AFSPC systems; and the Air Force has no current OCS capability to negate
an adversary’s use
of space, short of a conventional munitions attack on a terrestrial node.
...
AFSPC
will sustain its current space surveillance capabilities through a variety
of Service Life
Extension Programs (SLEPs) and other modifications to systems such as
the Eglin Radar,
GLOBUS II, and the Ground-based Electro-Optical Deepspace Surveillance
System
(GEODSS). AFSPC will also strive to modernize by enhancing its SSA capabilities
and
developing initial ground-based DCS and OCS capabilities. Examples include:
•
SSA – AFSPC will augment the SSN with an upgrade to the Haystack
radar and a new
ground-based X-band phased array radar network to improve detection of
small objects.
AFSPC will also develop an integrated SSA C2 architecture based on concepts
such as
the SSA Core System (SSACS).
• DCS – AFSPC will enhance spacecraft survivability by improving
tactics, techniques,
and procedures and ensuring future spacecraft incorporate survivability
measures.
• OCS – In the near- and mid-term, AFSPC will field initial
ground-based OCS capabilities
such as the mobile Counter-Communications (jams uplinks/downlinks), Counter-ISR
(blinds optical sensors), and Counter-Navigation (prevents adversaries
from using
space-based navigation signals) systems.
Transform
AFSPC
will also work to transform its Counterspace capabilities by fielding
revolutionary spacebased
capabilities through the mid- and far-term. Examples include:
•
Space-based space surveillance systems including close-proximity inspectors
that are
capable of providing details of space objects unattainable by ground-based
systems
• An attack detection and reporting architecture based on the Rapid
Attack Identification,
Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) concept capable of detecting,
characterizing
(identify and geo-locate), and reporting attacks on space systems, and
assessing the
resulting mission impacts
• Active on-board and/or on-orbit capabilities to protect our space
systems from manmade
or environmental threats
• Full spectrum, space-based OCS systems capable of preventing unauthorized
use of
friendly space services and negating adversarial space capabilities from
LEO to GEO
altitudes
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Nuclear
deterrence has been one of our nation’s highest priorities and will
continue to be a
top priority for AFSPC through the far-term. In the near-term, several
MM III life extension
programs currently underway will provide for a “capable, reliable,
and fully supportable
Minuteman III missile over the next two decades”. We will also proceed
with developing a
conventional prompt global strike capability to be fielded in the mid-term.
Finally, we will
continue to explore options for providing a T&E capability in the
far-term to support Missile
Defense.
Sustain
and Modernize
Though
Peacekeeper will be deactivated in the near-term, we will sustain Minuteman
III with life
extension programs through 2020 and modernize with a follow-on ICBM. Additionally,
we will
sustain and modernize the Minuteman infrastructure (e.g., communications
networks, command
center, and security programs) to maintain a vital nuclear deterrence
through the far-term.
Transform
Conventional,
non-nuclear prompt global strike from and through space and space-based
T&E
for missile defense will transform AFSPC Space Force Application capabilities.
Most notably, a
conventional strike capability, possibly in the form of a Common Aero
Vehicle (CAV) launched
by a ballistic missile, air launch system, or a space launch system, will
provide the President
and the Secretary of Defense with a range of space power options for deterrence
and flexible
response when time is absolutely critical, risks associated with other
options are too high, or
when no other courses of action are available.
...
As
previously stated, the US military enjoys a degree of potential asymmetric
advantage via our
space capabilities that is not widely understood. Space is deeply imbedded
in our warfighting
capabilities, and we have come to rely on our space capabilities almost
as a fact-of-life utility.
But much more awaits us. Training and education are crucial in fostering
a cultural change as
we move from an air force to an integrated air and space force. We must
help commanders and
the forces they command become confident and competent users of space
capabilities.
...
Counterspace
There
are presently no formal US policies preventing development or deployment
of
Counterspace capabilities. In actuality, the President’s National
Space Policy, the DoD Space
Policy, and the Secretary of Defense’s policy on Counterspace all
require development of
“negation” capabilities and deployment as needed to ensure freedom
of access and operations
in space. However, President and/or the Secretary of Defense approval
will be required for any
employment of force against enemy space assets, including ground and link
segments of space
systems. The major question in fielding OCS systems is the political will
to do so.
Conventional
Strike
Our
vision calls for prompt global strike space systems with the capability
to directly apply force
from or through space against terrestrial targets. International treaties
and laws do not prohibit
the use or presence of conventional weapons in space. Policy makers are
working to create
conditions for a New Triad that includes non-nuclear global strike weapons.
Non-nuclear prompt
global strike space capabilities are being studied. Our Nation will decide
whether or not to
pursue the development and deployment of conventional, space-based systems
for global strike
to fully exploit the advantages of space.
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