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[cover page]
26 May 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador R. W. Komer
VIA: AD/RDW
FROM: Nelson H. Brickham
SUBJECT: Personal Observations
Attached herewith is an informal memorandum summarizing
my personal observations, after twenty months in country,
concerning the requirements of our situation in Vietnam. It
reflects a management philosophy as well as a discussion of
our main problems, and is significant only as it contains
the analysis, rat1onale, and more detailed development of
thoughts behind the organization proposals recently submitted
to you.
[page one]
REQUIREMENTS OF A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. The management system must provide for development
and review of basIc strategy (of pacification) and for review
and/or modification of strategy and programs corresponding to
fundamental changes in the situation or to new opportunities
and requirements.
B. The system must address itself to the radical improve-
ment of basic performance in a number of programs, and it must
address itself to achievement and preservation of coordination
and integration of programs and efforts.
C. The management system must be designed around a highly
decentralized command system, which focal command point (Sector/
Province) must coordinate and manage highly diverse and techni-
cally specialized programs. However, this is done in a series
(44) of largely repetitIve situations.
D. The system must therefore provide clear definition
and communication of goals; it must be sensitive to progress
towards those goals and to deviations from programs and required
levels of performance, and it must be responsive to control,
redirection and corrective action for correction of inadequate
performance and coordination, and corresponding to changing
situations and to problems.
A. Basic National Goals and Strategy of Pacification
Basic goals and pacification strategy, as well as pro-
gram requirements in terms of this strategy, are amply and ade-
quately set forth in a series of documents, notably the Klein
Report, the Roles and Missions Study Group Report, planning
documents issued in November 1966 for the RD 1967 Planning
Conferences, and the 1967 Campaign Plan.
Programs of the several agencIes are responsive to and
in accordance with the basic strategy. A number of these
programs were developed and in existence prior to the drafting
of the above basic documents, and as a matter of fact, were
contributive to their preparation.
The basic programs, especially in the intelligence and
action areas, have all demonstrated their usefulness and
soundness and do not require modification. They do require
coordination, integration, improvement and intensification.
These are management and operating problems (as opposed to
planning and strategy problems).
[page two]
-2
That basic strategy and programs are both comprehensive
and sound does not argue against the fact that modification
can and should be made, as we learn new facts, or as new
problems emerge.
For example, there is too little realization of the impact
of conventional military operations on the "infrastructure"
and on the guerrilla war. Documents captured earlier this
year permitted the first real insight in this facet of the war,
and demonstrated significant degradation of the VC infrastruc-
ture, the VC guerrilla capability, the loss of support from
the villages and hamlets, an increasingly difficult food situ-
ation, etc. There have been only two comprehensive analyses
of these trends (one MACV and one OSA), and their obvious
lessons in terms of militnry operations, military/civil opera-
tions, new requiremerits for attack on infrastructure, have not
been drawn, or incorporated into pncification strategy, except
in a piecemeal fashion.
Likewise, new problems have been recognized or, while
foreseen, have mushroomed to such an extent as to outstrip all
capabilities for handling them. An outstanding example of
such problems is that of disposal of VC after they are captured
The war is a run on a treadmill as long as existing and totally
inadequate process and facilities for detention and neutrali-
zation of captured VC remain unchanged. This is an example of
a problem area requiring very highest level attention and
solution.
New opportunities, new insights and new problems must be
incorporated into basic strategy and basic programs, and any
"general staff for pacification" must be ennabled to recognize
and respond to such opportunities, insights and problems.
B. Coordination and Performance
The main problem in Vietnam is one of implementation and
coordination of the various programs, civilian and military. Few
if any of the programs are new. If each program is implemented
with full effectiveness, and if all of them pull together, in
concert, then we could expect quite striking advances in rela-
tively brief time periods.
The first necessity is coordination and integration. in
Province, on the American side; until we achieve that, it is
difficult to talk cooperation and integration on the Victnamese
side. This need for American coordination and improved effec-
tiveness of all elements of the American Province Team has
been constant refrain, in various reports and memoranda, going
back to 1963 (and earlier) Various experiments have been
made in the effort to create coordinated Province Team Appro-
aches, but they have, by and large, not succeeded, or have
[page three]
-3-
succeeded in only one or a few Provinces. The OCO structure
has made some progress in certain areas, but it has been
disappointingly slow.
There has been highly varying performance, or program
effectiveness, of the various agencies. This could be
illustrated a dozen different ways. The Provinces have not
been adequately staffed, nor in many cases can it be said that
the people involved have been doing thier <sic> jobs. A Refugee
officer arrives at a District town, kicks bags of rice off of
his helicopter and then disappears. A PFF Company is given
an occasional visit by a so-called advisor. A Public Safety
man is supposed to set up a detention camp: he arrives at
District headquarters in the company of a regionnl OCO staff
officer. looks around for fifteen minutes and disappears,
never to be seen again, and the U.S. Division has to set up
and man the camp for him. ARVN and Sector will have nothing
but contempt for Police intelligence. Certain officers of
some agencies spend as much time in Saigon, or at least out
of Province, as possible; many of them don't budge out of
their Province capitals into the Districts nnd villages. A
MACV Senior Advisor will censor reports so as to present a
rosy picture (if ARVN was as good as he says it is, we should-
n't have a war). One element of OCO will produce a major
staff study without coordination or reference to the line unit
concerned, which study may be radically incorrect. Too many
officers, of all agencies, betray an abysmal ignorance of
programs of their colleagues, programs which they are supposed
to be supporting, or from which they could gain support for
their own operations.
There are the numerous "private wars" going on. One
person pushes one program, which may be in radical conflict
with programs pushed by others, either in his own agency or
in another agency. A combat unit may ignore "infrastructure"
and go around looking for big main force enemy which they
never or rarely find. (This is the "IV Corps Syndrome", but
American units have been known to do the same.) Province
Chiefs, and Sector will force police to ignore infrastructure
and concentrate exclusively on military OB sightings. Combat
units both ARVN and American, will operate in Provinces with no
reference to Sector, and therefore with no reference to or
exploitntion of locally held tactical intelligence, and of
course, without taking advantage of potential local assistance.
Higher command levels will evacuate important prisoners before
local exploitation, especially of "infrastructure" information,
can be done. Each Corps (Region) and each Province develops
its own "war lord" psychology, going off in its owm direction,
not necessarily in accordance with basic program and mission.
[page four]
-4 -
There are numerous grave weaknesses. Province and Sector
will misuse PRU units, committing them to static defense or to
conventional military use in a conventionnl fashion. The Police,
and Police Special Branch will not, except in a few situations,
be incorporated into RD planning, so that they are unable to
program against requirements. OCO Province Reps and Sector
Advisors will "forget" to get inputs from Special Branch Advisors
for the Special Joint Reports.
C. Decentralized Decision Making.
It is totally unfeasible to exercise tactical control of
Province and pacification operations, even with a complete
real time communications systems. This implies tactical control
decentralization to Corps (Region) and Sector (Province) in
accordance with orthodox military and civil organizational
command lines.
This places a high premium on the individual orientation,
initiative and aggressiveness, in the first instance, of Sector
(Province) personnel.
With such far-flung decentralizntion, however, and recog-
nizing (a) the traditional weaknesses of traditional information
systems, (b) the diverse and centripetal tendencies and pressures,
(c) the necessity for blending together a wide range of diverse
technical specialties, (d) the necessities to monitor progress,
identify problems and initiate corrective action, and (e) the
need in its own right for large amounts of various types of
information, the necessity for detailed central knowledge and
a high degree of program control at Saigon level becomes
evident.
D. Reports and Information Systems.
"Modern corporate experience has demonstrated that manage-
ment of large and diverse enterprises requires a wide range of
facts to arrive at good decisions. Accordingly, the benefits
of a comprehensive reporting system are many. It aids decen-
tralization without loss of control and saves executives' time
by locating and anticipating problems, thus enabling them to
concentrate more on finding solutions and preventing adverse
effects. It also spreads scarce executive talent over a larger
number of critical areas."
Centrally designed and controlled reporting and information
systems are therefore becoming more and more prominent in
management literature. This trend towards centralized design
and processing has been given enormous impetus by the advent
of various automated data processing systems, which have a
[page five]
-5-
greatly expanded capacity for storing, manipulating and repro-
ducing information, at a greatly incrensed processing speed.
Automatic data processing potential greatly modifies
(increases) substantive raw information requirements at a
central processing point. This process is underway in both
substantive traditional military intelligence collation func-
tions and also in the infrasturcture area, at the CICV automa-
tic data processing center. Therefore, while previously there
was no substantive requirement for raw information transmitted
to Saigon (for other than management spot checking purposes),
now there is.
Proper design of the management reporting and information
system is crucial. This is true not only in terms of information
flow upwards, but also in terms of the feedback to echelons of
the system and to the Provine operations.
<indented>
The reporting system should be:
-Designed to elicit the kind of performance desired,
by identifying areas that top command believes are of
priority importance and that are subject to continuing
scrutiny. So designed as to focus responsibilities
and induce self-initiated corrective action.
-Designed to serve multiple purposes--i.e., service
requirements of several management echelons simul-
taneously, so as to reduce the number of disparate
excessive and probably uncoordinated requirements
originating in various echelons. Reports system
design must be realistic and not overburdensome,
violation of which destroys either the reporting
system or the officers' effectiveness or both. A
rapidly rising marginal cost of information must be
kept in mind.
-Designed so as to surface, directly or indirectly,
key problem areas requiring top management attention--
misunderstandings, malcoordination, et cetera.
-Designed so as to elicit certain key facts relative
to and reflective of an officer's performance, which
may prove grounds for either corrective or possibly
later disciplinary action.
[page six]
-6 -
The OSA field reporting system was designed expressly with
the above considerations in mind. The following decisions were
made:
<indentation>
a. Its monthly periodic report. This keys the report
in with Liaison Service reporting cycles. A month is
short enough time to permit meaningful feedback and
corrective action, is long enough time to have suffi-
cient activity and accomplishments to include, and is
not so long a period of time as to have too much to
report.
b. The report combines narrative and statistical
reporting. This report is a comprehensive one,
reflecting recurring requirements from Washington,
from Saigon and from Regions. It combines both
objective and factual, and subjective reporting.
c. The report reflects activities, understanding,
and thinking and writing ability. It is designed as
a "projective test", so to speak. The relatively
few officers who (a) perform poorly but write well,
or (b) perform well but write poorly are rather
easily and rapidly discovered and identified.
d. The report focusses on basic program performance
and on key areas of management importance and interest.
e. The report includes items and statistical reporting,
which, correlated with other factors, yield good clues
as to program progress, as to officers <sic> performance as
well as to performance and functioning of related
systems--first-echelon supervision, for example, and
American team cooperation.
f. The report provides a factual and subjective basis
for evaluation and investigation.
<end indentaion>
In addition to the (OSA monthly management report, there
are a variety of other reports required, (most of which
however are prepared by the Liaison Service) and are submitted
as attachments to the basic monthly report. Of special
importance are the so-called spot reports which form the
basis for bi-weekly reports to Washington and for feedback
dissemination to Province. This latter feature--publication
and feedback to Region and Province, is exceptionally impor-
tant, because it reflects and recognizes the Province Officer's
[page seven]
-7-
own activities, it tells him what other people are doing,
identifies to him important (and reportable) activities, and
induces a competitive and emulative spirit.
There are of course many more facets to the overall
Province reporting problem than are encompassed by the OSA
reporting system. Sector has its reports, daily, weekly
and otherwise; AID and JUSPAO have theirs, which have been
partially integrated in the OCO modification of the Special
Joint Report (monthly).
The modifications made by OCO in the Special Joint
Report were not too helpful. and as a matter of fact, were
a step backwnrds. The previous SJR was a report requiring
input from all agencies, and carried signatures of all
agencies, reducing opportunity for slanted and distorted
reporting. OCO reduced the signatories to two, the OCO
Province Representative and the Senior Sector Advisor. The
net effect has been that in a number of instances, an input
is no longer requested of the PSB advisor, nor perhaps may
he even see the report. This means that his programs are
reported and commented upon by someone who known relatively
little about them, nor does our officer know what is being
said. The second fault of the new OCO report is its pre-
occupation, in numerous statistical appendices, with trivia.
This is a carryover of the USAID planning and programming
system.
One grave problem which a management reporting system
must address is that of distortion and cover-up. This
has been described by one officer as follows: "... The
whole current system of reporting statistics that prove
either to Congress or to the American public or the
President that successive generations of American officials
in Vietnam are more successful than their predecessors--
these things are just getting in the way of solving the
problem.... Then you have a group of Americans in the
field, the majority of whom serve a one-year tour. They
go through the honeymoon phase in which they try to see
everything good about their counterpart and about the
situation and report it thus. Then they go through a per-
iod of disillusionment, in which they realize that nothing
has been accomplished, but by this time they have become
the victims of their own past reports and they have to
maintain the fiction. Ultimately they go out of there
very discouraged and probably very unhappy with their own
performance because about the time they become knowledge-
able to really do something they are on their way
home and have no desire to hurt their own professional
career."
[page eight]
-8-
In addition to management information systems (handled
differently by different agencies), there are numerous sub-
stantive sub-systems now in existence in Vietnam. Police
Special Branch collection and processing of information is
one such sub-system. The PIC system is a separate but
related sub-system. There are various military intelli-
gence sub-systems. The militnry and OSA infrastructure
sub-systems are gradually being brought together, but
tactical intelligence sub-systems are poorly integrated.
Prisoner exploitation sub-systems have been poorly integra-
ted (hopefully now resolved). No effective attack has yet
been devised for measuring impact on and degradation of VC
infrastructure. The Chieu Hoi exploitation and reporting
sub-system leaves much to be desired. Information feedback
to Province of captured documents and prisoner exploitation
by OSA is well established, but is a problem which has only
recently been addressed by MACV.
Some of these sub-systems are clearly and obviously
autonomous and integral. Others however, should just as
clearly and obviously be closely related and integrated,
which they are not. Others yet should exist and don't.
Complementary to a management information system,
there must be a top management investigative or inspection
function. This function must be empowered to conduct or
direct routine and special investigations and reviews, both
announced and unannounced. It must be empowered to impound
files for special investigations, and conduct private as
well as joint interviews. This is not nor should it be
allowed to gain the color of hostile or necessarily cri-
tical investigation. One major purpose is to give the
necessary human and intuitive feel and content, which puts
flesh and blood around the statistical and narrative reports.
The investigative function, in its routine visitation
aspect, can be instructional and "orientational", in terms
of coordination and program functioning (but necessarily
must avoid command direction)
E. Management System Design.
There are several different organizational solutions
at the Mission level responsive to the specifications and
discussion above. These different solutions are not neces-
sarily alternative; they can be regarded as transitional,
one being a step in evolution to the next.
[page nine]
-9-
A minimal solution would be similar to that in operation
in the Ford Motor Company. In this, Ford formed an "operating
committee" consisting of all functional Division chiefs,
which meets once a week. A comprehensive statistical report--
between 50 to 60 pages in length--is presented, going into all
factors of production, market, costs, inventories, and
trends. The statistical and narrative presentation is designed
to highlight and focus attention on operating conditions, on
changes, and on indicators, of problem areas. Only three full
time officers are required for the presentation and presentation
of this report (after the system was installed). It required
complete systems design for the reports <sic> content, information
system and computer back-up.
Our problem is substantially different, but is amenable
to the same approach (without its totally statistical content).
Under this concept a working committee would be formed, under
the chairmanship of Mr. Komer, composed of Chief, OSA; J-2;
J-3; Chief, OCO; AD/RDW; Chief RDSD; AD/PSD; Chief, OSA/ID.
The committee probably should meet bi-weekly. This would
constitute the "board of directors" for pacification.
A small and select reports group, working with raw Pro-
vince (Sector) input direct from the various agencies but
also special reports obtained from the agencies, would
systematically cover a series of selected topics, identified
as reflective of key management problem areas. Province staff-
ing by the various agencies would be one such topic. Prisoner
and Chieu Hoi accession and disposition would be another. RD
Team locations, actions and casualties would be another, as
would quantitative and qualitative description of intelligence
reports accessions, PRU operations, et cetera. Province
inspection reports would be presented.
Such a system could be inaugurated almost immediately,
based on input of existing information flow from the various
agencies (raw traffic). A reports group of an estimated four
officers. drawn from MACV, OSA and Mr. Komer's staff could
be formed with little difficulty. One of them should be a
professional information system analyst as well as a statis-
tical expert (from either MACV or USAID MID).
This group, under guidance of the "board of directors"
would begin immediately a review of reporting from all agen-
cies, and undertake immediately an information system design,
[page ten]
-10-
per the discussion above. Or, alternatively, the Reports
Group could begin immediately functioning in the staff capa-
city, and two professional consultants in information analysis
could be brought from Washington, for a comprehensive study.
Such a study should in no circumstances require more than
three months time.
A second solution would use the first as a core, or
nucleus, but would add the Program Manager concept. The Pro-
gram Manager concept has been developed in both industry and
government as a method for coordinating, stimulating and
focussing diverse elements and activities of different organi-
zational components, from top-management level. It provides
centralized planning, direction and supervision of the specific
programs, while at the same time preserving the line of command
integrity of each separate organizational component. While
operating with and through regular line of command, the con-
cept permits direct contact with the various action elements,
within the context of the program, this short-circuiting
numerous reporting and managerial "filters".
In industry and commerce, these officers are known as
"Product Managers" and in appropriate circumstances this
approach has proved to be highly effective and valuable.
In Government (e.g., as in the new Department of State
reorganization, and as in the military) they are known as
either Program Managers or Project Officers, depending upon
the echelon or level at which they are functioning. (Additional
information on Product Manager concept is available if desired).
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