{{UPDATE, July 8, 2008: Links changed to Internet Archive mirror of now-missing site. Images of quoted documents added to this page. Subhed added.}}

>>> In September 1999, the Associated Press presented a piece of investigative journalism on a massacre of civilians that took place during the Korean War. This article claimed that "in late July 1950, in the conflict's first desperate weeks, U.S. troops--young, green and scared--killed a large number of South Korean refugees, many of them women and children, trapped beneath a bridge at a place called No Gun Ri."

In a familiar turn of events that takes place whenever US forces are accused of massacres, figures in the military and the government (and their pals in the media) decried the report, saying that no such massacre had taken place. The witnesses were called into question, and, indeed, some of their testimony was problematic. When it appeared that some civilians had indeed been killed, though, excuses were trotted out: It wasn't nearly as many as the AP has claimed; they were killed by confused lone-wolf soldiers who weren't acting under orders; etc.

The firestorm over this one particular incident was remarkably effective in drawing attention away from the larger issue. The AP reporters had dug up irrefutable evidence--official military documents from the time period--which plainly show that high levels of the military had given orders to kill civilians. Some documents relate that civilians were deliberately massacred by plane-fire, explosives, and bayonets.

Thus, even if nobody was killed at No Gun Ri, we have concrete proof of other massacres. And we have the proof that orders to murder civilians came from military brass.

Below you'll find crucial portions of military documents, with links to scans of the entire documents. This material was put online in conjunction with the publication of No Gun Ri, the follow-up book written by the AP reporters who broke the story.

[read the original series]
[read about the book]

From Eighth Army Headquarters (the highest command in Korea) to all US and South Korean units, 3 January 1951:

This reiterates previous instructions that you have complete authority in your zone to stop all civilian traffic in any direction. Responsibility to place fire on them to include bombing rests with you.

[read the original document]

From memo from Col. Turner C. Rogers, U.S. Fifth Air Force deputy for operations, on 25 July 1950:

II.3. The army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions.

II.4. To date, we have complied with the army request in this request.

It is important to note that when the Pentagon released its study of the massacre in 2001, it reproduced Col. Rogers' memo but deleted these two paragraphs.

[read the original memo]

From the communications log (journal) of the Eight Cavalry Regiment, 24 July 1950:

No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children.

[read the original log]

From memo from Major General Kean to 25th Infantry Division, 27 July 1950:

Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been completed.

All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.

The authors of No Gun Ri note: "The accompanying overlay map outlined an area covering the entire warfront."

[read the original memo]

From headquarters journal for 25th Infantry Division, 26 July 1950:

CG (Kean) directed we notify Chief of Police that all civilians moving around in combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot.

[read the original journal; second on page]

From instructions to 25th Infantry Division from Maj. Gen Kean, July 1950:

PAREN COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS WILL TAKE DRASTIC ACTION TO PREVENT MOVEMENT OF ANY KOREAN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL INTO THEIR AREAS WITHIN THE COMBAT ZONE PD CIVILIANS WITHIN THE COMBAT ZONE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS ENEMY

[read the original instructions; bottom of page]

From the log of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 9 August 1950:

Shoot all refugees coming across river - from Scrappy 6 [i.e., Col. Raymond D. Palmer].

[read the original log]

From the journal of the 1st Cavalry Division artillery command, 29 August 1950:

Fr Capt Frohardt: Saber 6 [i.e. Gen. Gay] orders all refugees to be fired on.

[read the original journal]

{{Document image is not in the Internet Archive. Please get in touch if you have it.}}

From Action Summary for US Navy aircraft carrier Valley Forge, 25 July 1950:

Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed by one plane in accordance with information from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked.

[read the original document]

From a message from Chaplain Phillips to the 25th Infantry Division's Intelligence section, 28 July 1950:

FIRST CAV IS TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE CIVILIANS WHO ARE REMAINING IN THE COMBAT AREA UP TO WITHIN TWO MILES OF KUMCHON BY THE USE OF BAYONETS AND OTHER MEANS OF FORCE.

[read the original message]

{{Document image is not in the Internet Archive. Please get in touch if you have it.}}

A massacre of hundreds of civilians is described by the man who ordered it. From a narrative written by General Gay and sent to a military historian, 1953:

By nightfall on the 2d of August [1950] all troops were across the Naktong except the rear guard of the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry. Orders were to blow both the railroad and the footbridge Waegwan. The Division Commander [i.e. General Gay himself] gave orders that no one could order the bridge blown but he himself. At dusk thousands upon thousands of refugees were on the west side of the Naktong and as the rear guard of the 8th Cavalry would start across the bridge, they would follow them. The Division Commander ordered the rear guard to go back to the west side and hold back the refugees and when all was set they would run across the bridge to east side so it could be blown. This scene was repeated several times, but each time the refugees were on the heels of the rear guard. Finally it was nearly dark. There was nothing else to be done. The Division Commander gave the order to blow the bridge. It was a tough decision because up in the air with the bridge went hundreds of refugees.

[read the original document]

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posted 21 Oct 2002 | updated 08 July 2008

copyright 2002 Russ Kick